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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information is one of the most important input to the choices we make, whether in our
personal lives, as part of society, or as a formal member of an organization. Like any
other input, information is scarce. Most of our decisions are made under conditions
of uncertainty. Some types of uncertainties are out of our control. We simply cannot
know whether a coin will land heads or tails. Other types of uncertainties, we
have (some) control over. We can refer to weather reports to reduce the chance of
encountering bad weather on a holiday.
Uncertainty that we can control (to whatever degree) occurs primarily due to
information asymmetries, i.e. diﬀerent economic agents (individuals, ﬁrms, govern-
ments) know diﬀerent things. One reason for asymmetries, quite naturally, is that
individuals know themselves (their skills, intentions, motivations) better than others.
Another reason is the economic process itself. In the market economy, information
is produced by and dispersed across various economic agents. Whatever the reasons
may be, information asymmetries are pervasive, and some of the most interesting
developments in economics are by virtue of information asymmetries.
One such development, which is also the topic of my dissertation, concerns
transmission of information between economic agents (broadly speaking, signalling
games). Communication serves a powerful tool that can help reduce uncertainty in
decision making. One has to tread carefully though as communication suﬀers from
issues of credibility. It is well understood that agents in a position to inform others
on decision relevant matters can, and often do, attempt to manipulate information.
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In situations where an informed party and uninformed party (the decision maker)
have no conﬂict of interest, that is, they have the same end goal, then there is no
issue of credibility. Once there is a conﬂict of interest, even to slight degree, the
informed party has an incentive to manipulate information to inﬂuence the decision
taken by the uninformed party. Communication is thus strategic. A seller of a good,
for instance, has incentive to exaggerate the quality of his product to make a sale.
Likewise, a job applicant would like an employer to believe that he is of high ability.
Two aspects are of particular interest in the presence of conﬂicted goals. The
ﬁrst concerns the amount of information that the better informed party can credibly
communicate to the decision maker. The second concerns the extent to which a
better informed party is able to inﬂuence the decision towards his own interest.
Broadly speaking, I explore these two concerns in strategic communication. An early
contribution by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) shows that competition between two
parties with opposing preferences, such as in a legal dispute, leads to full information
decisions. The reason is that any piece of information that is harmful for one party,
is beneﬁcial for the other party. Competition thus, provides incentive to either of
the two parties to reveal information.
There are two crucial assumptions for this result. The ﬁrst is that each party
is fully informed. If this assumption fails, then full revelation of information breaks
down. The second is that information can be credibly transmitted. This brings us
to an important distinction between hard and soft information. Hard information
is veriﬁable and cannot be fabricated (at least not without a cost). Credibility of
hard information is thus not a concern. Soft information, on the other hand, is not
veriﬁable. It consists of plain conversation such that any statement is permissible in
equilibrium. Credibility in transmission of soft information requires that preferences
or goals of agents are not too conﬂicted (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).
In this dissertation, I relax one or both of these assumptions. The ﬁrst paper
considers a scenario where competing parties are not fully informed, but information
is hard and thus can be credibly transmitted. The second and third papers consider
scenarios where parties are fully or partially informed, but information is soft so
credibility is a concern. In the second, information transmitted by the sender is
relevant for multiple decisions taken by an uninformed receiver. In the third, the
sender communicates with a receiver who has private (non-overlapping) information.
In each paper, we analyze how much information the sender is able to credibly
communicate to the decision maker, and to what extent, if at all, the sender is able to
inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome towards his own interest by communicating strategically.
3Below I provide a brief overview of each paper. The ﬁrst two, chapters 2 and 3 of
this manuscript, are coauthored with my supervisor Otto Swank.
Chapter 2: In the ﬁrst paper, we consider a scenario where a policy maker or a
judge requires information to resolve a distributional dispute between two competing
parties, such as lobby groups. The judge wants to make the right decision. This
depends on an unknown state. Each party wants the decision to be in its own
favor irrespective of the state. They must ﬁrst exert costly eﬀort to acquire hard
information about the unkown state. The main question we are interested in is
whether parties with easier access to information have a disproportionate inﬂuence
on outcomes. To this end, we allow the two parties to diﬀer in their (marginal)
cost of eﬀort. The more eﬀort a party exerts to collect information, the higher is
the probability that a party ﬁnds veriﬁable information. Although hard information
cannot be fabricated, it can be concealed. Thus if information is found, the party
has to determine whether to reveal it or conceal it.
We show that the party that is relatively advantaged in terms of collecting infor-
mation has stronger incentives to reveal it. The reason is that if the stronger party
does not reveal information, the decision maker (judge) is skeptical and is inclined
to believe that the party has something to hide. As a result, when neither party
presents evidence, the decision is biased towards the interest of the weaker party.
We show, however, that in expected terms the ﬁnal decision does not depend on
the relative strength of the parties. This is a neutrality result. Our model predicts
that, in line with the literature, relatively powerful interest groups frequently provide
information that shapes policy. However, our model also predicts that if powerful
interest groups do not provide information, decisions are made against their inter-
ests. In expected terms, these eﬀects cancel out. Finally, we show that a policy that
compels parties to reveal information destroys their incentives to collect information.
We regard our neutrality result as a benchmark. Lobbying groups may system-
atically aﬀect policies in case the assumptions underlying our model are violated.
Neutrality requires that the decision maker correctly assess the abilities of interest
groups to collect information. Underestimation of the stronger parties ability will
bias the decision in its favor. Clearly, neutrality does not hold anymore if the decision
maker is biased or can be bribed.
Chapter 3: In the second paper, we consider the interaction between a politician
and a bureaucrat to analyze decision making under an open rule. Under an open rule,
bureaucrats play a purely informational role in the policy making arena. Politicians
make their decisions based on the information provided by bureaucrats. Under a
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closed rule, on the other hand, bureaucrats have agenda setting power whereby they
make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to politicians. A closed rule yields predictions in line
with the work of Niskanen (1971, 1975) who emphasized that agenda setting power
enables bureaucrats to induce politicians to accept high budgets. Under an open-
rule, however, bureaucrats are less likely to increase public spending. The reason is
that rational decision makers anticipate that information supplied by bureaucrats is
ﬂawed. As a results, decision may be based on poor information, but budgets are
not too large or too small on average.
We re-visit policy making under an open-rule, where the novel feature of our
model is that the politician has to make two decisions. He not only has to decide on
the amount of spending to allocate for a project, but also whether to implement the
project in the ﬁrst place. For instance, he has to decide whether to build a public
library, and also has to decide on the size of the book collection for the library. A
bureaucrat is informed about the public demand for library services. We assume that
the bureaucrat wants the provision of the public service for a lower demand, relative
to the politician. Moreover, he also wants a relatively higher budget allocated to the
service.
We show that concerning the size of public projects, information asymmetry and
misaligned preferences do not lead to distortions in expected terms. Bureaucrats try
to exaggerate the demand for a public service, but rational politicians see through
their attempts. However, concerning the implementation decision, we show that
bureaucrats are able to increase the likelihood of the provision of a public service.
Politicians implement projects they would not implement if they were fully informed
themselves. Together these two results predict that public swimming pools, libraries,
parks or museums, are not too large (or too luxurious) on average, but that there
are too many of them.
We also derive some theoretical results for the literature on communication with
unveriﬁable information, i.e. the cheap talk literature. First, we show that if infor-
mation communicated by the sender is to eﬀect the both types of decisions, then
there is a spill-over between the spending decision and the implementation decision.
Large distortions in the spending decision make implementation less attractive. Sec-
ond, we show that if the sender of information wants project implementation, then
his message must convince the decision maker that the state is good enough. We
call this an implementation constraint. It imposes a limit on the maximum num-
ber of messages the sender can use in equilibrium. In other words, communication
deteriorates in the presence of multiple decisions. Third, we show that the sender
5may beneﬁt from less communication than an equilibrium permits. This is unlike
the typical cheap talk outcomes. Finally, we show that if the sender is biased with
respect to one decision, then the receiver wants the sender to be biased about the
second type of decision as well.
Chapter 4: In the ﬁnal paper, we analyze communication with a decision maker
who is privately informed. This is typical of most real world settings. In organiza-
tions, for instance, managers typically possess private information about the projects
they wish to implement in the ﬁrm. A consultant may advice the manager about
market conditions, however, whether the stated market conditions are suitable for
the objective of the ﬁrm depends on the personal view of the manager. It is well
understood that if the view of the manager is shared by others in the organization,
then it leads to less inﬂuence activities via strategic communication. Casual obser-
vation however, shows that managers are often inclined to take advice from external
market participants, such as management consultants, instead of from individuals
within the ﬁrm. In this paper, we rationalize these opposing views to show that
informed ﬁrm managers may sometimes prefer to receive information from external
market participants who do not internalize the private values of the manager. This
paper addresses two main questions. First, how does communication from a sender
diﬀer if the manager is privately informed? Second, does a sender who values the
information of the manager reveal more of his own private information in comparison
to sender who does not value it?
To address these questions, we model a simple cheap talk game between a man-
ager and an agent. The manager has to choose whether or not to implement a
project. Project quality is privately observed by the agent. The key feature of the
model is that the manager has private information. The important assumption con-
cerning the information structure is that the private information of both players is
non-overlapping, or independently distributed. This can be interpreted in two ways.
First, the manager may have a personal taste concerning the project. Second, the
manager may be informed about costs and funding opportunities for the project that
agent does not observe. We assume that there are two kinds of the agent. An agent
with shared values internalizes the manager’s private information while an agent
without shared values only cares about project quality. Both types of agents earn
some private rents from project implementation, such as intrinsic rewards.
The communication results show that an agent with shared values can reveal
rich information. The agent ﬁne-tunes his information into numerous intervals (mes-
sages), and reveals relatively precise information. An agent without shared values
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can use at most two messages. The reason for richer communication is that an agent
who values the manager’s information internalizes costs associated with implemen-
tation of projects that are not suitable for the ﬁrm. This encourages him to reveal
less noisy information. With respect to the quality, in terms of the informativeness
of messages, we show that communication with shared values deteriorates at a rel-
atively faster rate if the agent’s private rents increases. As a result an informative
equilibrium breaks down relatively faster under shared values, and the beneﬁt of a
ﬁner partition is undermined. Speciﬁcally, if private rents of the agent are suﬃciently
small (large), then communication is stronger with (without) shared values. This
results is robust to common knowledge of the manager’s information. We also show
that this diﬀerence in communication eﬀects the agent’s incentives to collect infor-
mation. If rents are suﬃciently small (large), then an agent with (without) shared
values exerts relatively higher eﬀort.
These results contribute to various streams in the literature. With respect to
corporate culture and homogeneity of preferences, they imply that shared values may
lead to stronger inﬂuence activities in an organization. With respect to theory of
the ﬁrm, they highlight costs in communication as a determinant of ﬁrm boundaries.
In particular, they show that it is not trivial to assume that integrating various
functions in a ﬁrm leads to stronger communication or information ﬂows. Finally,
these results also add to the cheap-talk literature. First, the private information
of the receiver allows him to extract relatively more precise information from an
agent, conditional on its payoﬀ relevance for the agent and on the size of private
rents. Second, a privately informed receiver does not lose real authority over an
implementation decision, unlike an uninformed receiver. The implication is that the
sender is not able to bias the decision towards his own interest. Third, the receiver
will prefer to fully share his information with an agent who values it even though
this biases the decision towards the sender’s interests. The reason is that the agent
is able to fully utilize his information.
Chapter 2
Do Parties With Easier Access to
Information Have a Disproportionate
Inﬂuence on Policy?
Coauthored with Otto H. Swank
2.1 Introduction
In a wide variety of situations, people make decisions on the basis of information
supplied by other people. Often those who provide information have a ”stake” in the
ﬁnal decision. A prominent example of such a situation is a civil lawsuit involving
a dispute between two parties about a distributional issue. Each party supplies
information in an attempt to inﬂuence the judge’s decision in its own favor. Another
well-known example is a politician who makes a decision that aﬀects various interest
groups. Again each group may provide information with an eye on inﬂuencing the
politician’s ﬁnal decision to its own beneﬁt. When decisions are made on the basis of
information provided by interested parties, there are usually two (related) concerns.
First, interested parties have incentives to reveal information that is favorable for
them, but to conceal information that is unfavorable for them. As a result, the
decision maker possibly does not hear all available information. Second, the means
8
Do Parties With Easier Access to Information
Have a Disproportionate Inﬂuence on Policy?
of interest groups vary widely. An implication is that decisions may be biased towards
the interests of groups with easier access to information.
The main objective of this paper is to shed light on these two concerns. To
this end, we develop a game-theoretical model in which a neutral person has to
resolve a distributional dispute between two parties; say, an amount of money is
to be distributed. The socially optimal decision depends on the state of the world.
The parties, however, have opposite interests that do not depend on the state of
the world. As to learning the state, the decision maker has to rely on information
provided by the parties. We assume that the parties do not observe the state of
the world,1 but each party can exert eﬀort to ﬁnd veriﬁable information about it.
The more eﬀort a party puts in collecting information, the higher is the probability
that a party receives veriﬁable information about the state. If information is found,
a party has to determine whether to reveal or conceal it. An important feature of
our model is that parties may diﬀer in the (marginal) cost they attach to exerting
eﬀort. The implication is that there is a relatively advantaged party and a relatively
disadvantaged party. In this way, we are able to address the concern regarding the
inﬂuence of powerful interest groups on decisions. Another important feature of our
model is that given the available information, the decision maker aims at making
the socially optimal decision.
We derive four main results. The ﬁrst one is neither novel nor surprising. Par-
ties reveal information that promotes their interests, but conceal information that
damages their interests.
Our second result is more subtle. The party that is relatively advantaged in terms
of collecting information has stronger incentives to reveal it. The reason for this
result is that when the advantaged party does not reveal information, the decision
maker is inclined to believe that the party has something to hide. As a result, when
neither party presents evidence, the decision is biased towards the interest of the
disadvantaged party.
Third, in expected terms, the ﬁnal decision does not depend on the relative
strength of the parties. This neutrality result sheds light on the role of powerful
interest groups in politics. Our model predicts that indeed relatively powerful interest
groups frequently provide information that shapes policy. However, our model also
predicts that if powerful interest groups do not provide information, decisions are
made against their interests. In expected terms, these eﬀects cancel out because of
1In section 2.8 we show that our main results also hold when parties observe the state of the
world but must exert eﬀort to communicate information.
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the Martingale property.
Our ﬁnal result is that a policy that compels parties to reveal information destroys
their incentives to collect information.
Together our results indicate that the concern that interested parties have in-
centives to conceal information is justiﬁed. However, compelling parties to supply
information does not help. It would only weaken incentives to collect information.
The concern for biased decisions because some parties have easier access to informa-
tion than others is less justiﬁed. Rational decision makers take the relative strength
of parties into account in such a way that diﬀerences in the power of parties do not
lead to biases in decisions.
It is important to point out from the outset that we obtain our results from a
model of informational lobbying in which the decision maker is unbiased. Of course,
if the decision maker is biased or can be bribed our result that in expected terms
the relative power of parties is irrelevant does not hold any more.
2.2 Literature
Our paper is related to two broad strands of economic literature. First is the liter-
ature on law and economics; researchers have investigated attorneys’ incentives to
collect and convey information in adversarial systems. An early paper is by Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986) who show that communication between interested parties
with opposed interests leads to full-information decisions. Crucial assumptions for
this result are (1) that information can be credibly transmitted, and (2) that par-
ties are fully informed. When parties are not always fully informed, full revelation
disappears (Austen-Smith, 1994; Shin, 1994; Swank, 2011). Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999) show that parties with opposing preference have also strong incentives to col-
lect information (Dur and Swank, 2005; Kim, 2012). In the literature on adversarial
systems, our paper is closest to Sobel (1985), who examines parties’ incentives to
report information in case of a dispute over an indivisible asset. As in our paper, in
Sobel one party might be more advantageous in reporting information than the other
party. Sobel examines how diﬀerent rules of proof of evidence aﬀect parties’ incen-
tives. Our paper deviates from Sobel in that we focus on a dispute over a divisible
asset. Moreover, we explicitly distinguish between incentives to collect information
and incentives to transfer information.
Second, our paper is related to the voluminous literature on interest groups.2
2For surveys, see Mitchell and Munger (1991); Mueller Dennis (2003); Austen-Smith (1997).
10
Do Parties With Easier Access to Information
Have a Disproportionate Inﬂuence on Policy?
Olson (1965) argues that smaller groups face lower costs to organize themselves, and
consequently may have a disproportionate inﬂuence on policy. In Tullock (1980)
and Becker (1983) interest groups decide how many resources to spend on lobbying.
The amount of resources aﬀects the probability of inﬂuencing the decision. It is this
type of literature that predicts that an interest group with more resources has a
bigger say in policy decisions. The early literature on lobbying posits the existence
of an inﬂuence function describing how lobbying eﬀorts aﬀect policy. Potters and
Van Winden (1992) provide a micro-foundation for these inﬂuence functions. A key
assumption of their model is that an interest group possesses information that is
relevant for a legislator. By paying a cost an interest group can credibly transmit
information to the legislator. Potters and Van Winden show that the more the
preferences of the interest group and the legislator are aligned, the wider is the scope
for information transmission.3 Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), like us, model two
groups that try to inﬂuence the decision of a legislator. Each group decides whether
or not to become informed. This decision is observed by the legislator. Next, the
two groups send messages to the legislator who makes the ﬁnal decision. Our model
deviates from Austen-Smith and Wright in three main respects. First, in our model,
the decision and states are continuous rather than binary. Second, in our model,
the decision-maker does not observe whether or not parties are informed. Finally,
one of the main questions we address is whether more powerful interest groups have
a bigger say in decisions, whereas the model by Austen-Smith and Wright is very
suitable for understanding groups decisions on whether to lobby or not.
Similarly, some studies consider a group’s choice of whether to use informational
lobbying for inﬂuence or whether to use an alternative instrument such as cam-
paign contributions (Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006) or political pressure (Dahm
and Porteiro, 2008). These models, though closely related to ours, are more suit-
able for understanding groups choice of the type of instrument to use for inﬂuence.
Cotton (2012) considers the question of whether rich groups have a disproportionate
inﬂuence on policy in a model where contributions determine access to the politi-
cian. They show that rich interest groups gain more access than poor groups, but
that they are not better oﬀ compared to poor groups due to the politicians rent
extracting strategy. While Cotton’s focus is on the inﬂuence of strong groups due to
better access to politicians, our focus is on the inﬂuence due to better information
collection capabilities. Grossman and Helpman (2001) develop a cheap-talk model
3See also Grossman and Helpman (2001).
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where interest groups are fully informed, but information is not veriﬁable.4 Their
model too is more suitable to understand group decisions on whether to lobby or
not. Moreover, their focus lies on the requirements for credibility when talk is cheap.
They show that credibility improves with the amount of resources a group spends
and thus provide a rationale for why interest groups spend more than is necessary to
communicate messages. Lastly, common knowledge of the marginal cost of informa-
tion collection allows the decision maker in our model to make an unbiased decision,
which points towards the beneﬁts of lobbying disclosure laws. In contrast, Denter
et al. (2011) model lobbying as a contest between groups to show that mandated
transparency of lobbying costs leads to an over-investment by groups and decreases
expected allocative eﬃciency.
2.3 The Model
Our model describes a situation where a decision has to be made with important
distributional consequences. One can think of, for example, the allocation of a tax.
We assume that it is common knowledge that there is a socially optimal decision in
the sense that reasons may exist why one party should be favored to the detriment of
another party. To learn these reasons, the decision maker relies on the information
supplied by the interested parties. We consider a setting in which each party wants
to make a case for itself.
A decision maker has to choose x, where x ∈ [l, h]. One can think of the decision
maker as a politician, a CEO, or a judge. The problem is that the proper decision
is uncertain. This uncertainty is reﬂected by the stochastic term μ, the state of
the world, which is uniformly distributed5 on the interval [l, h]. The decision maker
chooses x so as to minimize the expected deviation of x from μ, given the information
(I) it possesses: minx : E(|x− μ| |I).
To learn μ, the decision maker has to rely on information provided by two inter-
ested parties, i ∈ {a, b}. One can think of a party as an interest group, a manager of
a division, or an attorney. Neither party knows μ initially. However, each party may
collect information to learn μ and receive a signal si ∈ {φ, μ}. Collecting information
is costly. Speciﬁcally, we assume that each party i chooses eﬀort πi ∈ [0, 1), where
πi denotes the probability with which party i ﬁnds veriﬁable information about μ,
si = μ. With probability 1− πi party i does not ﬁnd information, si = φ. For sim-
4See also Krishna and Morgan (2001), and Visser and Swank (2007).
5The uniform distribution does not alter our results qualitatively. See also footnote 8.
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plicity, we assume that the cost of information collection is quadratic: 1
2
λiπ
2
i , with
λi >
1
2
(h− l).6
An important feature of our model is that λa may diﬀer from λb. If λa < λb, we
say that party a is the more powerful party. The parameter λi may capture a few
things. First, λi may depend on the resources party i possesses to collect information.
Second, the eﬃciency with which a party collects information may aﬀect λi. Third,
λi may depend on party i’s position in the economy. For instance, information about
the impact of a deregulation in an industry often lies in the hands of that industry.
In this paper, we take a broad view of the various factors that may determine λi.
We assume that the two parties have opposing preferences. Party a wants the
decision maker to choose a high value of x, whereas party b wants the decision maker
to choose a low value of x. The payoﬀs to party a and b are given by:
Ua(x) = x− 1
2
λaπ
2
a (2.1)
and
Ub(x) = −x− 1
2
λbπ
2
b (2.2)
respectively.
After the parties have collected information, the communication stage starts. In
this stage, the two parties simultaneously send a message, mi, to the decision maker.
A party conditions its message on the information it received, mi(si). We assume
that information cannot be forged but can be concealed. Thus, if party i did not
ﬁnd information in the collection stage, it cannot supply information, mi(φ) = φ.
If, by contrast, party i found information, say si = μ
′, it either sends mi(μ′) = μ′
(reveals) or sends mi(μ
′) = φ (conceals). After the parties have sent their messages,
the decision maker chooses x.
We assume that the structure of the game and the distribution of μ is common
knowledge. Our model is a dynamic game with imperfect information. We solve it
by backward induction and identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). The decision
maker chooses x so as to minimize E(|x−μ||ma,mb). Parties anticipate the decision
maker’s decision rule.
6In the appendix we show that if λi ≤ 12 (h − l), an equilibrium exists in which party i chooses
πi = 1 and always reveals information to the decision maker. As a result, party −i is redundant.
By assuming λi >
1
2 (h− l), we ensure that the model focuses on environments where both parties
have incentives to collect information. This is the most relevant environment to investigate how
the relative strength of parties aﬀects decisions.
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2.4 Communication Stage
Each party enters the communication stage either with the possibility to present
evidence to the decision maker or without this possibility. This depends on whether
or not a party was successful in the information collection stage. We call a party that
is able to reveal information “informed”, and a party that is not able “uninformed”.
By assumption, an uninformed party sends mi(φ) = φ. The question remains for
which values of μ an informed party sends mi(μ) = φ and for which values of μ it
sends mi(μ) = μ. Proposition 1 presents the equilibrium communication strategy of
an informed party.
Proposition 1. In a PBE, parties’ communication strategies can be characterized
by a single threshold, μT . An informed party a chooses ma(μ) = μ if and only if
μ ≥ μT = E(μ|ma = mb = φ). An informed party b chooses mb(μ) = μ if and only
if μ ≤ μT .
Proposition 1 is an implication of our assumption that the parties have opposing
preferences. Information that is favorable for party a is unfavorable for party b, and
vice versa. At μ = μT , both parties are indiﬀerent between revealing information
(mi(μ) = μ) and concealing it (mi(μ) = φ). The decision of a party to reveal
information or not is only relevant in case the other party does not reveal information.
As the decision maker chooses x = μ if either party reveals information, mi(si) is not
relevant if m−i(μ) = μ. So, to determine party a’s decision whether or not to report
information, suppose mb(sb) = φ and sa = μ
′ ∈ {l, h}. Clearly, ma(μ′) = φ induces
the decision maker to choose x = E(μ|ma = mb = φ), while ma(μ′) = μ′ induces the
decision maker to choose x = μ′. Hence, party a is indiﬀerent between ma(μ′) = μ′
and ma(μ
′) = φ if,
μ′ = μT = E(μ|ma = mb = φ) (2.3)
For party b, the same equation can be derived.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that in case both parties are able to
provide evidence, the decision maker makes the full-information decision. This result
is similar to the result derived by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) that competition
between informed parties whose preferences are opposed leads to full-information
decisions. Proposition 1 also implies that parties never provide evidence that conﬂicts
with their own interests.
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2.5 Information Collection Stage
We now turn to a party’s decision on how much eﬀort to put in collecting veriﬁable
information. Consider party a. When choosing πa party a anticipates that it will only
reveal information in the communication stage if μ ≥ μT . Moreover, it anticipates
that if party b ﬁnds information, it will reveal it if and only if μ ≤ μT . Finally, it
knows that revealing μ leads to x = μ. The expected payoﬀ to party a when choosing
πa equals,
Pr(μ ≥ μT )[πa1
2
(h+ μT ) + (1− πa)μT ] + · · ·
Pr(μ ≤ μT )[πb1
2
(μT + l) + (1− πb)μT ]− 1
2
λaπ
2
a (2.4)
The ﬁrst (second) term of (2.4) pertains to the range of μ for which party a (b)
reveals information if it is found. The third term gives the cost of eﬀort.
Diﬀerentiating (2.4) with respect to πa, and using Pr(μ ≥ μT ) = h−μTh−l and
Pr(μ ≤ μT ) = (μT−l)
h−l , we attain
7
πa =
(h− μT )2
2λa(h− l) (2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that the higher is the deviation of μT from h, the more
eﬀort party a puts in collecting information. Of course, the reason for this result
is that the deviation of μT from h is directly related to the probability that party
a will utilize its information. To put it somewhat diﬀerently, party a has stronger
incentives to collect information when it anticipates that the information is likely to
be favorable to its cause. Obviously, it also has stronger incentives when the cost of
collecting information is small.
In a similar way, one can derive the amount of eﬀort party b exerts:
πb =
(μT − l)2
2λb(h− l) (2.6)
Note that party b’s eﬀort strategy is the converse of party a’s strategy. When party
b anticipates that it is likely to ﬁnd information that is favorable to its cause, it has
strong incentives to collect information.
7Due to our assumption λi >
1
2 (h− l), we have πa < 1.
2.6 The Threshold 15
2.6 The Threshold μT
In Section 2.4, we have identiﬁed the communication strategies of the two parties.
In these strategies, the threshold μT plays an important role. Party a reveals infor-
mation if and only if it has found that μ ≥ μT , while the opposite holds for party b.
In the previous section, we have examined the incentives of parties to collect infor-
mation. Again the threshold μT turned out to be important. In the present section,
we use parties’ strategies to determine the threshold μT .
In Section 2.4, we have shown that the threshold μT equals the expected value
of x, conditional on ma = φ and mb = φ. The decision maker knows that if both
parties had found information, one of them would have revealed it. He can therefore
infer from ma = φ and mb = φ that at most one party found information. As a
consequence, parties not revealing information can be a result of three events. First,
party a found information, but decided not to reveal it. Then, μ < μT . Second, party
b found information, but decided not to reveal it, so that μ > μT . Third, neither
party found information. As πa and πb are independent of μ, in the third event
the expected value of μ equals 1
2
(l + h). Together these events imply the following
expression for μT ,
μT =
πa(1− πb)
(
μT−l
h−l
)
l+μT
2
+ πb(1− πa)
(
h−μT
h−l
)
μT+h
2
+ (1− πa)(1− πb) l+h2
πa(1− πb)
(
μT−l
h−l
)
+ πb(1− πa)
(
h−μT
h−l
)
+ (1− πa)(1− πb)
(2.7)
which can be rewritten as,
(μT )2(πa − πb) + 2μT [h(1− πa)− l(1− πb)]− h2(1− πa) + l2(1− πb) = 0 (2.8)
To better understand how μT depends on πa and πb, ﬁrst suppose that πa = πb.
Then, (2.8) reduces to μT = 1
2
(l+h). This implies that in the absence of information,
the decision maker chooses a neutral decision when parties exert the same amount
of eﬀort. Now suppose πa = πb. Straightforward, but tedious, algebra shows that μ
T
is increasing in πb and decreasing in πa. A direct implication is that for πa > πb, in
the absence of information, a decision is made that is biased against party a. The
intuition is straightforward. If πa > πb, the decision maker attributes a relatively
high probability to the event that party a possesses information. Consequently, in
case neither party provides information in the communication stage, the decision
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maker is especially suspicious that party a wants to hide information. Likewise for
πb > πa and ma = φ and mb = φ, a decision is made that is biased against party b.
The eﬀect of πa = πb on the decision on x inﬂuences parties’ incentives to collect
information. Recall that party a’s eﬀort equals πa =
(h−μT )2
2λa(h−l) . Clearly, the lower is
μT , the higher is πa. Again, this eﬀect has a clear intuition. Party a anticipates
that in case the decision maker does not receive information about μ, he will make a
decision that is biased against its interest. This gives a stronger incentive for party
a to collect information.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, μT is implicitly determined by (2.8). If λi < λ−i
and ma = mb = φ, a decision is made that is biased against party i.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 sheds a new light on the claim that powerful interest groups are
able to put a stamp on policy. Our model predicts that indeed powerful interest
groups frequently provide evidence that heavily inﬂuences policy. In this sense, it
is true that powerful interest groups have a disproportionate inﬂuence on policy.
However, we have also shown that in case a powerful interest group does not provide
information, the decision is biased against its interest.
The next proposition shows that the relative strength of interest groups does not
aﬀect the expected decision on x.
Proposition 3. In expected terms, the value of λi relative to λ−i does not aﬀect the
decision on x.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the Martingale property and we inter-
pret it as a neutrality result.Of course, when one of the assumptions of our model
is relaxed the neutrality result may break down.8 For example, we have assumed
that the decision maker knows the relative strength of parties. If the decision maker
were to have a wrong perception of λi, the neutrality result would no longer hold.
Underestimation of the relative strength of a party induces the decision maker, in
expected terms, to choose a policy that is favorable for that party. It is also im-
portant to emphasize that the neutrality result only holds for informative lobbying.
Evidently, allowing for bribes may alter our results since they will directly inﬂuence
the preferences of the decision maker.
8It is important to note that relaxing the assumption that μ is uniformly distributed does not
break down this result. In the proof provided in the appendix, we show that neutrality holds for a
general distribution function.
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2.7 Forcing Parties to Reveal Their Information
In the previous sections we have analyzed incentives of parties to collect and supply
information. We have shown that a party only reveals information that beneﬁts its
cause. In the current section we examine the implications of a policy that forces
each party to reveal its information, whether that information is favorable for it
or not. Such a policy in our model is akin to the assumption that information
cannot be concealed. Consequently, the communication strategy of party i becomes:
mi(si) = μ for si ∈ [l, h], and mi(φ) = φ. Note that in this setting the expected
value of μ when the decision maker does not receive information equals E(μ|ma =
φ,mb = φ) =
1
2
(l + h).
The resulting model revolves around information collection. When choosing the
amount of eﬀort to exert, parties anticipate that any information they ﬁnd will be
revealed, leading to x = μ. Thus, the expected payoﬀ to party a when choosing πa
is,
(1− πa)(1− πb)
(
h+ l
2
)
+ [1− (1− πa)(1− πb)]
(
h+ l
2
)
− 1
2
λaπ
2
a (2.9)
The ﬁrst term is the expected payoﬀ in case neither party ﬁnds information. The
second term is the expected payoﬀ in case either of the two (or both) parties ﬁnd
information. The last term is the cost of eﬀort. The ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to πa implies that the amount of eﬀort party a exerts is πa = 0. Similarly,
one can show that party b has no incentive to collect information. Hence, compelling
parties to reveal their information completely eliminates their incentives to become
informed. This brings us to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. A policy that compels parties to reveal their information eliminates
their incentives to collect information.
Proposition 4 casts doubts on rules in legal systems that compel prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. One primary purpose of these rules
is to ensure that all parties go to trial with as much knowledge as possible. Our
result suggests that these rules may have an unintended consequence of discouraging
parties to collect information in the ﬁrst place.
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2.8 Costly Communication
So far, we have focused on a situation where parties have to exert eﬀort to ﬁnd
information. An alternative situation is that parties have information but have to
make eﬀort to convey it to the decision maker.9 To analyze the latter case, we
assume that when choosing their strategies on eﬀort, parties know μ. In the new
model, πi denotes the probability that party i is able to provide veriﬁable evidence to
the decision maker, and λi can be interpreted as a measure of party i’s accessibility
to the decision maker. Speciﬁcally, in the alternative game we have that (1) nature
chooses μ and reveals it to the parties, but not to the decision maker; (2) each party
chooses eﬀort on the basis of μ, πi(μ); (3) if party i is able to reveal information, it
reveals it or conceals it; (4) the decision maker chooses x.
The assumption about the observability of μ does not have consequences for the
strategies followed in the communication stage. The communication strategies can
again be characterized by a single threshold, μT . Each party only reveals information
when it perceives that it will lead to a more favorable decision.
Incentives to exert eﬀort, however, are diﬀerent in the present model. Because
each party observes the state, eﬀort is conditional on the state. The more favorable
is the state to party i, the stronger are its incentives to exert eﬀort.10 Moreover, if
μ ≤ μT , party a does not exert eﬀort, and if μ ≥ μT party b does not exert eﬀort.
Thus, either party a or party b tries to convey information.
The assumption about the observability of μ does not aﬀect our main result that
in expected terms, the relative power of parties does not inﬂuence the decision on
x. Of course, the reason is that also in the present model the Martingale property
implies that the expected value of x equals 1
2(l+h)
.
2.9 Conclusion
Do more powerful interest groups have a disproportionate inﬂuence on policy? We
have shown in this paper that in an environment where interest groups try to in-
ﬂuence decisions by concealing or revealing information, the answer to this question
is in the negative. By often providing information, more powerful interest groups
9Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to
policy makers. For a review of empirical models of interest group inﬂuence see Potters and Sloof
(1996) and Stratmann (2005).
10Speciﬁcally, πa(μ) =
μ−μT
λa
for μ > μT and πa(μ) = 0 for μ ≤ μT , and πb(μ) = μ
T−μ
λb
for μ < μT
and πb(μ) = 0 for μ ≥ μT .
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do frequently inﬂuence policies. However, when they abstain from providing infor-
mation, decisions are biased against their interests. In expected terms, these eﬀects
cancel out.
We regard our neutrality result as a benchmark. Interest groups may systemati-
cally aﬀect policies in case the assumptions underlying our model are violated. For
instance, we have assumed that the decision maker forms expectations in a rational
way. In practice, this means that the decision maker should distinguish between
cases where more powerful interest groups do not provide information and cases
where less powerful interest groups do not provide information. Moreover, our neu-
trality result requires that the decision maker correctly assess the abilities of interest
groups to collect information. Finally, we have ignored the possibilities that interest
groups bribe decision makers and that decision makers may already have ideological
preferences over policies.

Chapter 3
Bureaucracy and Overprovision of
Public Goods
Coauthored with Otto H. Swank
3.1 Introduction
An important determinant of public policy is the interaction between politicians and
interested, informed parties. Politicians have to make numerous decisions on topics
about which they have little expertise. As a result, they have to rely on other people,
like bureaucrats, who possess information. Niskanen (1971, 1975) developed a model
of the interaction between poorly informed politicians and well-informed bureaucrats.
In his work, their information advantage gives bureaucrats agenda-setting power that
enables them to inﬂuence public policies considerably.
In the last four decades, several authors have built on Niskanen’s seminal work.
Most of them have maintained the assumptions that relative to politicians, bu-
reaucrats have an information advantage, and that the preferences of politicians
and bureaucrats diﬀer. Progress has been made in (i) the analysis of alternative
decision-making procedures, and (ii) modeling the transmission of information from
bureaucrats to politicians. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) distinguish be-
tween decision-making under a closed rule and an open rule. Under a closed rule,
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bureaucrats have agenda-setting power. They oﬀer take-it-or-leave-it proposals to
politicians. Under an open rule, bureaucrats play a purely informational role. Politi-
cians make decisions on the basis of information provided by bureaucrats. Most of
these studies employ signaling models to better understand the transmission of in-
formation between bureaucrats and politicians (see also Austen-Smith (1993), and
Banks (1990).
Generally, models, describing decision making under a closed rule, yield predic-
tions that are in line with Niskanen’s work. Agenda setting power enables bureau-
crats to induce politicians to accept high budgets. Under an open decision-making
procedure, bureaucrats are less likely to increase public spending. The reason is
that rational politicians anticipate that information provided by biased bureaucrats
is ﬂawed. As a result, decisions are made on the basis of poor information. However,
in expected terms, budgets are not too small or too high.
In the present paper, we employ a cheap-talk model to analyze decision-making
under an open rule. The novel feature of our model is that the politician has to
make two decisions. First, she has to make an implementation decision, say, to
build a library or not. Second, she has to make a spending decision, say, how
much money to spend on the collection of books for the library. The sender of
information, the bureaucrat, has superior information about the demand for the
public service. Moreover, he wants the public service to be implemented for a lower
demand than the receiver of information, the politician. Another assumption is that
given implementation, for each level of demand, the bureaucrat wants higher public
spending than the politician. The assumptions about the distribution of information
and the players’ preferences are in line with the spirit of earlier Niskanen models.
The introduction of an implementation decision allows us to investigate how the
interaction between bureaucrats and politicians aﬀects both the number of projects
and the size of projects.
We derive a couple of results. Our ﬁrst result is that concerning the size of
public projects, information asymmetry and misaligned preferences do not lead to
distortions in expected terms. Bureaucrats do try to exaggerate the demand for
public services, but politicians see through these attempts. This result is in line
with the results from cheap-talk models a` la Crawford and Sobel (1982). Our second
result is that bureaucrats are able to distort implementation decisions. Politicians
implement projects that they would not implement if they possessed full information.
Together these results predict that public swimming pools, libraries, public parks or
museums are not too large or too luxurious, but that there are too many of them.
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Apart from our results regarding public decision-making, we derive a few the-
oretical results. First, there is a spill-over between the spending decision and the
implementation decision. A large distortion in the spending decision makes imple-
mentation less attractive. Second, when the sender wants to induce implementation,
his message must reveal that the demand is suﬃciently high. We show that this
“implementation constraint” deteriorates communication by imposing a limit on the
maximum number of intervals. Third, the equilibrium in which the maximum num-
ber of intervals are used is not always the equilibrium that yields the highest payoﬀ
to the sender. The sender may beneﬁt from less communication. The reason is that
more communication leads to low public spending for lower levels of demand. Fi-
nally, the receiver wants the sender to have identical preferences as himself. This is a
well-known feature of all cheap-models and is sometimes referred to as the Ally Prin-
ciple (Bendor et al., 2001). In our model, however, if the preferences of the sender
deviate in one dimension, say the implementation decision, then the receiver also
wants the preferences to deviate in the second dimension, say the spending decision.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the extended
cheap-talk game. Section 3.3 presents the analysis. Section 3.4 deals with the Ally
Principle. In Section 3.5 we discuss how the senders’s bias aﬀects the receiver’s
decisions. This section applies the game to communication between bureaucrats and
politicians. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
We investigate a situation where a decision-maker (D) has to make two decisions.
First, he has to decide whether to implement a project (x = 1) or to maintain status
quo (x = 0). Second, in case of implementation, D has to determine how much
money to spend on the project, d ∈ [0, h].
The optimal decisions for D depend on the state of the world, t. We assume that
t is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, h]. D does not observe t. An interested
party, the sender (S), does observe t. Having observed t, S sends a message m from
an inﬁnite message set M to D. After D has received m, he chooses x and d.
Let UI(x, d, t) (with I ∈ {D,S}) denote player I’s payoﬀ function. Maintaining
status quo (and thereby d = 0) yields a payoﬀ to player I equal to,
UI(0, 0, t) = aI − (t+ bI) (3.1)
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Implementation (x = 1) yields a payoﬀ to I equal to,
UI(1, d, t) = t− |d− (t+ bI)| (3.2)
Players’ preferences with respect to the spending decision are captured by the
term −|d− (t+ bI)|. If implemented, player I wants to spend (t+ bI) on the project.
Throughout we assume that bD = 0 and bS > 0. S prefers a higher amount of
spending than D. We refer to bS as S’s spending bias. Note that if the project is not
implemented, −|d− (t+ bI)| reduces to −(t+ bI). Maintaining status quo therefore
leads to a distorted spending decision.
Players’ preferences with respect to the implementation decision depend on this
distorted spending and on their predisposition, aI . We assume that players only
want the project to be implemented if the state is suﬃciently high. If d = t+ bI for
x = 1, then player I prefers implementation if t > aI−bI
2
. We assume that,
(i) aI − bI > 0, to ensure that a range of t exists for which I prefers x = 0,
(ii) aS ≤ aD, so that S is relatively more inclined towards x = 1 compared to D.
Note that if aS = aD, then S is still relatively biased towards x = 1 given our
assumptions on bI . With aS < aD, this conﬂict becomes stronger.
To illustrate what the above payoﬀ functions try to capture, suppose that D is
a local politician, and S is a librarian. The politician has to make two decisions
concerning a library. First, whether it should be established, and second, about how
large the collection of books should be if it is established. The state of the world
represents public’s demand for library services. The librarian knows this demand,
but the politician does not. The assumption that bS > bD implies that for any t,
the librarian wants to have a larger collection than the politician. The inequality
aS ≤ aD reﬂects that relative to the politician, the librarian wants the library to
be established for a lower demand for library services. One possible reason for this
bias is that the librarian wants to have a job in the new library. The assumption
aS − bS > 0 implies that the librarian is only in favor of establishing a library if the
demand for library services is suﬃciently large. Equation (3.1) captures that in case
D decides against establishing a library, the librarian and the politician dislike that
the demand for library services is not satisﬁed.
The structure of the payoﬀ functions is rather speciﬁc. We have two reasons
for adopting it. First, it nicely combines existing cheap-talk models with a binary
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decision, and cheap-talk models with a continuous decision.1 Second, the current
linear form of the payoﬀ function makes the model tractable. We could have made the
payoﬀ functions more general. For instance, a parameter for D and S could be added
to weigh the importance of the implementation decision relative to the importance
of the spending decision. We set this parameter to one to reduce notation. Adding
it, however, does not lead to important new insights. We could also have assumed
that players do not incur a loss of distorted spending from maintaining status quo
(i.e. UI(0, 0, t) = aI). This speciﬁcation would have reduced tractability, however.
A monotonicity condition might fail in the sense that low and high types of S may
pool together to send the same message.2
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of our game consists of a message strategy, beliefs,
an implementation strategy, and a spending strategy. Following Crawford and Sobel
(1982), we identify equilibria in which the message strategy is an interval strategy.
Speciﬁcally, we identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which the interval [0, h] is
partitioned in a ﬁnite number of intervals, and S reports to which interval t belongs.
We denote a partition by (ri−1, ri), and a partition strategy by R ≡ (ri−1, ri), i =
{1, · · · , n}, where n ≥ 1 denotes the number of pooling intervals. We denote D’s
beliefs about t by G(t|m). Having received m, D’s implementation strategy is x =
ξ(m). If x = 0, then d = 0. If x = 1, then D follows d = σ(m). Our game
belongs to the class of cheap-talk games. It is well-known that in this class of games
a pooling equilibrium always exists. In such a pooling equilibrium, S’s message does
not contain information, and D ignores S’s message. Throughout this paper we
ignore such babbling equilibria. In fact, we focus on equilibria in which at least two
pooling intervals exist, one of which leads to status quo.
1Our model can be related to the cheap talk models that extend Crawford and Sobel (1982)
to allow players’ to have an exogenous outside option. In Che et al. (2013), a project must be
selected from a set of available projects (see also Rantakari (2014) for more on project selection).
Preferences are biased only in terms of diﬀerent outside options. More closely related is Chiba and
Leong (2014), in which a spending and an implementation decision has to be made concerning a
project. In their model, the decision to implement does not depend on the state of the world, but
instead on the optimality of the spending decision such that players’ prefer to implement the project
only if the distortion in the spending decision is smaller than their outside option. In our model,
players may prefer their outside option even if there is no distortion on the spending decision.
2For such equilibria, see for instance Chiba and Leong (2014).
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3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Decision Maker’s Strategy
Suppose D has received a report m ∈ (ri−1, ri). From this report she infers that
t ∈ (ri−1, ri). It directly follows that if D chooses to implement the project, she
chooses d = 1
2
(ri−1 + ri). Status quo yields a payoﬀ to D equal to,
aD − 1
2
(ri−1 + ri) (3.3)
Implementation yields a payoﬀ,3
1
2
(ri−1 + ri)− 1
4
(ri − ri−1) (3.4)
x = 1 yields a higher payoﬀ than x = 0 if,
3
4
ri +
5
4
ri−1 > aD (3.5)
The assumption that aD > 0, implies a bias towards x = 0. To choose x = 1, D
must believe that the state is suﬃciently high. As a result, higher values of ri−1 and
ri, widen the range of aD for which D chooses implementation. In (3.4), the term
−1
4
(ri− ri−1) reﬂects that D dislikes uncertainty about the state when the project is
implemented. The wider is the interval, the more d deviates from t in expectation.
The term −1
2
(ri−1+ ri) in (3.3) denotes the distortion in the spending decision when
the status quo is maintained. In fact, for given ri−1 and ri, x = 0 leads to a larger
distortion in the spending decision than x = 1. The reason is that x = 0 implies
the extreme of zero spending d = 0, whereas x = 1 implies moderate spending,
d = 1
2
(ri−1+ ri). Introducing risk-aversion with respect to the spending decision will
strengthen this eﬀect.
3.3.2 Sender’s strategy
In this section, we assume that only in case S reports m ∈ [0, r1), D chooses x = 0.
In the next section, we come back to this assumption. At t = r1, S has to be
indiﬀerent between x = 0 on the one hand, and x = 1 with d = 1
2
(r1 + r2) on the
3Note that −1ri−ri−1
(∫ 1
2 (ri+ri−1)
ri−1
( 12 (ri + ri−1)− t)dt+
∫ ri
1
2 (ri+ri−1)
(t− 12 (ri + ri−1))dt
)
= − 14 (ri−
ri−1).
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other. Two cases have to be distinguished. First, in case 1
2
(r1 + r2) > (r1 + bS), S is
indiﬀerent between x = 0 and x = 1 if,
aS − (r1 + bS) = r1 −
[
1
2
(r1 + r2)− (r1 + bS)
]
r1 =
2aS + r2 − 4bS
5
(3.6)
Second, in case (r1 + bS) >
1
2
(r1 + r2), R is indiﬀerent between x = 0 and x = 1 if,
aS − (r1 + bS) = r1 −
[
(r1 + bS)− 1
2
(r1 + r2)
]
r1 =
2aS − r2
3
(3.7)
Generally, both x = 0 and x = 1 lead to a distorted spending decision. x = 0
always means that too little is spent. If 1
2
(r1+r2) > (r1+bS), then x = 1 leads to too
much spending. In this case, an increase in r2 makes implementation less attractive.
If 1
2
(r1 + r2) < (r1 + bS), then x = 1 leads to too little spending. Now an increase
in r2 makes x = 1 more attractive. Given x = 1, in the absence of a spending
distortion, meaning 1
2
(r1 + r2) = (r1 + bS), we get r1 =
1
2
(aS − bS) > 0.4 The eﬀect
of r2 on r1 in (3.6) and (3.7) describes a spillover between the spending decision and
the implementation decision. In case x = 0, the distortion in the spending decision
always equals (r1 + bS). In case of x = 1, the distortion depends on r1 and r2.
At t = ri for 1 < i < n, S should be indiﬀerent between sending m ∈ (ri−1, ri)
and sending m ∈ (ri, ri+1). Given that D chooses d = 12(ri−1 + ri) for i > 1, this
means that,
ri −
(
ri + bS − ri−1 + ri
2
)
= ri −
(
ri + ri+1
2
− (ri + bS)
)
which reduces to,
(ri+1 − ri) = (ri − ri−1) + 4bS (3.8)
Equation (3.8) is the indiﬀerence equation that would also result from a uniform-
linear version of the Crawford and Sobel cheap-talk model. It implies that partitions
closer to h are larger than partitions closer to r1. The reason why (ri+1 − ri) >
(ri − ri−1) is that at t = ri, S has to be indiﬀerent between sending m ∈ (ri−1, ri)
4Recall that we have assumed aI > bI to ensure that for a range of t, player I prefers x = 0 to
x = 1.
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and sending m ∈ (ri, ri+1). If two adjacent partitions were of equal length, at t = ri,
S would strictly prefer sending m ∈ (ri, ri+1) to sending m ∈ (ri−1, ri), because he
wants D to overestimate t. The partition (ri, ri+1) must be wide enough that sending
m ∈ (ri, ri+1) at t = ri induces D to overestimate t so much that it hurts S. This
discourages S from sending m ∈ (ri, ri+1). The system of equations (3.6), (3.7) and
(3.8) has multiple solutions for ri. These are outlined in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Deﬁne n¯ as the largest integer below 1
2
√
2(h− 1
2
aS)
bS
+ 1 + 3
2
. With n ≤ n¯
and 1
2
(r1 + r2) > r1 + bS, the borders of the second interval are,
r1 =
h+ 2(n− 1)aS − 2n(n− 1)bS
4n− 3 (3.9)
r2 =
5h+ 2(n− 2)aS − 2(5n− 3)(n− 2)bS
4n− 3 (3.10)
With n ≤ n¯ and 1
2
(r1 + r2) < r1 + bS, the borders of the second interval are,
r1 =
2(n− 1)aS − h+ 2(n− 1)(n− 2)bS
4n− 5 (3.11)
r2 =
3h+ 2(n− 2)aS − 6(n− 1)(n− 2)bS
4n− 5 (3.12)
The borders of the third to the (n− 1)th intervals are,
ri = (i− 1)r2 − (i− 2)r1 + 2(i− 2)(i− 1)bS (3.13)
Proof. See appendix.
The border of the ﬁrst interval is important as it determines the implementation
decision. For n = n¯, a value of bS exists for which r1 = r2 =
1
2
aS. The term
1
2
aS
can be interpreted as a lower bound of r1. A slightly higher value of bS implies that
the maximum number of intervals reduces by one. At this point, r1 remains the
same and r2 jumps above
1
2
aS [(3.9) and (3.10) become relevant for S’s strategy].
If bS increases further, r1 and r2 gradually decrease, until (3.11) and (3.12) become
relevant. After this point a further increase in bS shifts r1 upwards and r2 downwards
until they reach the lower bound at r1 = r2 =
1
2
aS. At this point an increase in bS
implies that n again reduces by 1.5
5Speciﬁcally, for a given n, equations (3.9) and (3.10) are relevant for bS <
2h−aS
4n2−8n+3 , while
(3.11) and (3.12) are relevant for bS >
2h−aS
4n2−8n+3 . And r1 = r2 =
1
2aS for bS =
2h−aS
4n2−12n+8 .
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3.3.3 Equilibria
In deriving S’s partition strategy, we have assumed that if S sends a message m ∈
(ri−1, ri) with i > 1, then D prefers implementation to status quo. As relative to
x = 0, x = 1 is more attractive for higher values of t, we should verify whether x = 1
yields a higher payoﬀ than x = 0 to D whenm ∈ (r1, r2). Clearly, ifm ∈ (r1, r2) were
to induce x = 0, then S’s ﬁrst two messages would be equivalent. We refer to the
restriction that m ∈ (r1, r2) should lead to x = 1 as the implementation constraint.
We ﬁrst demonstrate that given S’s strategy described by Lemma 1, D possibly
prefers x = 0 to x = 1 if m ∈ (r1, r2). Suppose that n = n¯ and that the second
interval is inﬁnitely small such that r1 = r2 =
1
2
aS. In this situation, D prefers x = 0
to x = 1 after having received m ∈ (r1, r2), if
aS < aD
as we have assumed in the model section. The intuition is clear. If r1 = r2 =
1
2
aS,
at t = r1, S is indiﬀerent between x = 0 and x = 1. As, relative to S, D is biased
towards x = 0, D prefers x = 0 at t = r1. For D to prefer x = 1, r2 has to be
suﬃciently large. Given S’s strategy, this means that the second interval has to be
suﬃciently wide.
The lengths of the intervals depend on the total number of intervals n. The
implication is that if for n = n¯ D prefers x = 0 to x = 1 after m ∈ (r1, r2), then for
n < n¯ she possibly prefers x = 1 to x = 0 after m ∈ (r1, r2). More generally, we can
show that the implementation constraint requires that n is suﬃciently small.6
Let nˆ denote the maximum value of n for which (3.5) with i = 2 holds. Proposi-
tion 5 describes equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 5. In any PBE equilibrium with n > 1 and n ≤ n∗ = min{nˆ, n¯}, the
strategy of S is given by (3.9−3.13), and D chooses x = 0 if m ∈ (0, r1) and chooses
x = 1 with d = 1
2
(ri + ri+1) if m ∈ (ri, ri+1) for i > 0.
To better understand how a smaller value of n can induce D to choose x = 1
when m ∈ (r1, r2), consider the following example. Suppose h = 1, aS = 0.1 and
bS = 0.045. For these values n¯ = 4, and r1 = 0.04, r2 = 0.18 and r3 = 0.5 (see
Figure 3.1a). This strategy of S can be part of an equilibrium, if D prefers x = 1 to
x = 0 after m ∈ (r1, r2). This requires that aD < 0.185. D should not be too biased
6To this end, substitute (3.9) and (3.10) into (3.5). Next, deﬁne the resulting expression in
terms of n and n− 1, and substract. It directly follows that the requirement (3.5) is satisﬁed for a
wider range of parameters for smaller values of n.
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towards maintaining status quo This is depicted by the dashed line at 0.185
2
. Suppose
that aD > 0.185, implying that no equilibrium exists with n = 4. With n = 3, S’s
message strategy leads to r1 = 0.10 and r2 = 0.46. In this case, D prefers x = 1 to
x = 0 after m ∈ (r1, r2) if aD < 0.46, a much weaker condition than with n = 4 (see
ﬁgure 3.1b). Finally, one can verify that for n = 2, D prefers x = 1 to x = 0 when
m ∈ (r1, r2) if aD < 1.0.
t
d
0.04 0.18 0.5
0.11
0.34
0.75
(a) n = 4 requires aD < 0.185.
t
d
0.1 0.46
0.28
0.73
(b) n = 3 requires aD < 0.46.
Figure 3.1: Implementation constraint (dashed line) relaxes with smaller number of
intervals (n): parameter values aS = 0.1 and bS = 0.045.
How do the equilibria described by Proposition 5 compare with the equilibria of
a standard linear-uniform cheap-talk model? There are three main diﬀerences. The
ﬁrst diﬀerence is the nature of the ﬁrst interval. In the extended model, m ∈ (0, r1)
induces D to choose x = 0 with d = 0. At t = r1, S is indiﬀerent between status
quo and implementation. In a standard linear-uniform cheap-talk model, in any
equilibrium with n > 1 the second interval is always wider than the ﬁrst one. If
the second interval were wider, S would prefer m ∈ (r1, r2) to m ∈ (0, r1). In the
extended cheap-talk model, the second interval can be narrower than the ﬁrst one.
The range of t for which S prefers status quo to implementation can be wide.
Second, introducing the implementation decision into a cheap-talk model adds a
new restriction: from the second to the nth interval D has to prefer x = 1 to x = 0.
As a higher value of t makes x = 1 more attractive relative to x = 0, this restriction
is most binding for the second interval. We have shown that the restriction becomes
weaker if n decreases. As a result, adding an implementation decision to a standard
cheap-talk model may make communication less precise in the sense that it may
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t
d
r1 = 0.11
r2 = 0.16
0.14
0.58
(a) Equilibrium with n = 3.
t
d
r1 = 0.14
0.57
r1 = 0.11
(b) Equilibrium with n = 2.
Figure 3.2: Sender prefers an equilibrium with n = 2 while an equilibrium with n = 3
is possible: parameter values bS = 0.2, aS = 0.25, aD = 0.26.
reduce the number of messages that can be used in equilibrium.
Third, generally, cheap-talk models suﬀer from a multiple-equilibrium problem.
Our cheap-talk model is not an exception to this. If an equilibrium exists with
n > 1 intervals, equilibria also exist with fewer intervals. In the special ”uniform-
linear” cheap-talk model without an implementation decision, both D and S are
better-oﬀ in equilibria with the highest number of intervals. The introduction of an
implementation decision alters this feature.
As an illustration, consider the following example (see ﬁgure 3.2). Let h = 1,
aS = 0.25, bS = 0.2, and aD = 0.26. For these parameter values, the maximum
number of messages in equilibrium equals n = 3. With three intervals, r1 = 0.11 and
r2 = 0.16. Note that in this equilibrium, if t ∈ (r1, r2) then spending on the project
is much too low from S’s perspective. For the same parameter values an equilibrium
exists with n = 2, where r1 = 0.14. In comparison to the equilibrium with n = 3, the
probability of implementation slightly decreases. However, spending on the project
is more in line with S’s preferences. As a result, the expected payoﬀ to S is higher
for n = 2 than for n = 3.
3.4 The Ally Principle
In standard cheap-talk games, be it binary or continuous, D is potentially best-oﬀ
when S’s preferences coincide with his own preferences. The idea thatD should listen
to an informed person who shares his own preferences is called the Ally Principle
(Bendor et al., 2001).
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To determine the optimal preferences of S from D’s perspective in our model,
we write D’s expected payoﬀ as a function of aS and bS. Maximizing this expected
payoﬀ with respect to aS and bS yields the following two ﬁrst-order conditions,
7
bS =
3(aS − aD)
4n2 − 8n+ 6 (3.14)
aS = aD + nbS (3.15)
These conditions show that the Ally Principle also holds in the extended cheap-
talk model: D’s expected payoﬀ is maximized if aS = aD and bS = 0. The ﬁrst-order
conditions also demonstrate the spill-over between the spending decision and the
implementation decision. If bS > 0, then D wants aS to deviate from aD. In fact,
D wants S to be biased towards x = 0. Unfortunately, as argued earlier, in most
real-world situations senders who want to spend more are also likely to be biased
towards implementation. As a result, the distortion in the implementation decision
and the distortion in the spending decision generally tend to reinforce each other.
3.5 Do Biased Senders Lead to too High Expen-
ditures?
In Niskanen (1971, 1975), agenda control and an information advantage enable bu-
reaucrats to induce politicians to spend too much from a social perspective. In a
standard linear-uniform cheap-talk model, S does not have agenda-setting power,
and the ultimate spending decision does not involve too much spending. Biased
senders lead to less communication, and in turn to less precise spending decisions.
However, in expected terms, the spending decision accords with D’s preferences. A
well-known implication is that both D and S suﬀer from S’s incentive to exaggerate
the state.
With regard to the spending decision, our results are similar to the standard
cheap-talk models. In expected terms the spending decision is in line with D’s pref-
erences.8 This means that our model predicts no bias concerning the size of a public
project. As to the implementation decision, however, a bias does exist. The imple-
mentation constraint implies that in expected terms D must prefer implementation
to status quo. We have argued that this requires the second interval to be suﬃciently
7These ﬁrst-order conditions are for the case that in equilibrium 12 (r1 + r2) > r1 + bS .
8This follows directly from D’s strategy to choose d = 12 (ri−1 + ri).
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wide. For low values of the state in the second interval, choosing to implement is
generally not in D’s interest. To see this consider again the example below Proposi-
tion 5. Suppose that aD = 0.4. In the example, this means that the maximum value
of n equals 3. Moreover, D chooses x = 1 if t > 0.10. If D were to observe t, she
would choose x = 1 if t > 0.2. Hence, S can induce x = 1 even though it is not in
D’s interest.
The implication is that the extended cheap-talk model predicts overproduction
of public goods. It is not that there is too much spending on the public goods that
should be provided. Rather sometimes public goods should not be provided at all.
To put it diﬀerently, on average the collections of books in public libraries are not
too large, and public swimming pools are on average not too big. The problem is
that from D’s perspective there are too many small libraries and too many small
swimming pools.
3.6 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is both theoretical and applied. Theoretically, we
have shown that introducing an implementation decision into a standard cheap-talk
model imposes an additional constraint on the sender’s strategy. A sender’s desire to
induce implementation deteriorates communication about the decision on how much
to spend. In the standard cheap-talk model, the sender always prefers equilibria
that allow for more communication. In our extended model, the sender may beneﬁt
from less communication. Our ﬁnal theoretical result is that in the extended model
more aligned preferences do not always improve communication. Once preferences
of the sender and receiver diﬀer in one dimension, say, the implementation decision,
the decision maker beneﬁts if the preferences also diﬀer in the other dimension. Our
main more applied result is that decision making under an open rule leads to higher
public spending through an excess provision of public goods, but does not lead to
excessive spending on speciﬁc projects in expected terms.
Throughout this paper, we have phrased our model as an extension of a stan-
dard cheap-talk model with an implementation decision. We could have phrased
our model as an extension of a binary cheap-talk model with a continuous deci-
sion. Provided that the preferences of the receiver and the sender are not too much
misaligned, in a binary version of a cheap-talk model the sender has real author-
ity and the receiver has formal authority Aghion and Tirole (1997). The receiver
“rubber-stamps” the sender’s recommendation. In the extended cheap-talk model,
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there exists a spill-over between the spending decision and the implementation deci-
sion. As a result of this spill-over, the implementation decision becomes more in line
with the receiver’s preferences. In this sense, from the receiver’s point of view, the
introduction of a continuous decision into a cheap-talk model of a binary decision
improves communication.
Chapter 4
Shared Values and Communication
4.1 Introduction
Shared beliefs and values are often considered an important aspect of organizations.
One beneﬁt is that they lead to more communication, and thus to less inﬂuence ac-
tivities (Van den Steen, 2010a). This is in line with Crawford and Sobel (1982) who
show that communication from an agent to a decision maker is more informative if
players’ preferences are similar. Relatedly, a few studies on ﬁrm boundaries argue
that integration, as opposed to market transactions, can facilitate stronger informa-
tion ﬂows and knowledge transfers (Malmgren, 1961; Arrow, 1975). It is not clear in
this literature why information ﬂows are stronger within ﬁrms, as also pointed out by
Bresnahan and Levin (2012). One potential rationale relates to shared organizational
values, or corporate culture. If members of an organization share similar beliefs and
values, then integration can facilitate communication. Some practitioners, manage-
ment consultants in particular, disagree. According to them a primary beneﬁt of an
external consultant is detachment from the organization and its culture.1 This paper
rationalizes these opposing views, and shows that an agent who shares the values of
the decision maker can sometimes reveal less information compared to an agent who
does not share these values.
1For example, Peter Drucker who is often considered to be the father of modern day consulting
industry writes in an essay that a management consultant“... brings to the practice of management
what being professional requires: detachment.” Drucker (1981)
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The key feature of this paper is that the decision-maker has a personal view
about the right course of action. This is in line with the literature which argues that
organizational leaders diﬀer in their beliefs and values. See for instance, Van den
Steen (2005) and more generally the management literature on corporate culture and
managerial vision. Empirical studies also conﬁrm this. Bertrand and Schoar (2003),
for instance, show that managers may diﬀer, all else equal, in the benchmark they
use in investment decisions, and in their ‘style’ such as taste for aggressive strategies.
Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2009) ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs are more
likely to engage in value-destroying mergers.
Given that the decision-maker has a personal view about the right course of
action for the ﬁrm, I address two main questions in this paper. First, how does
communication from an agent diﬀer if he shares the decision-maker’s view? Second,
does an agent who shares the decision-maker’s view reveal more information?
To address these questions, I model a cheap-talk game between an agent and a
ﬁrm manager. The manager has to choose whether or not to implement a project,
where project quality is observed by the agent. The optimal decision for the manager
depends on the sum of both players’ private, independently distributed information.
The manager’s private information (type) is interpreted as his vision concerning
the best course of action for the ﬁrm.2 The agent may share the manager’s vision,
in which case the agent internalizes the manager’s information. In addition, the
agent may derive exogenously determined rents from project implementation, such
as intrinsic rewards. I analyze how the quality of communication varies with these
rents given that the agent either shares or does not share the manager’s vision.3
The ﬁrst result concerns the nature of communication. In terms of cheap talk
equilibria a` la Crawford and Sobel (1982), an agent who values the manager’s type
is able to partition his information into relatively ﬁne intervals, while an agent who
does not value it can use a maximum of two intervals. The former reveals, for ex-
ample, that market demand is low, medium, or high, or he may reveal that project
quality is unacceptable, below average, average, above average, or excellent. The
latter agent, on the other hand, makes a recommendation for or against the project.
Communication is thus (potentially) richer under shared values. The reason is un-
certainty and payoﬀ relevance of the manager’s type. Due to private rents, both
2The main results are robust to common knowledge of the manager’s information. The manager’s
information can also be interpreted as a project dimension, such as costs.
3This distinction between shared organizational values and exogenous rents is crucial to the
analysis in this paper. For simplicity, I consider the extreme case. An agent either fully internalizes
the manager’s information, or he does not internalize it at all.
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types of agents have an incentive to inﬂate project quality to increase the likelihood
of implementation. This can lead to implementation of projects that are not in line
with the manager’s vision. Cost associated with implementation of bad projects is
payoﬀ relevant for an agent who shares the manager’s vision. It gives him the ability
to ﬁne-tune his information as diﬀerent messages generate diﬀerent costs. An agent
who does not value the manager’s type does not internalize the cost. He prefers
implementation as long as project quality is suﬃciently high.
The second result concerns the quality of communication. We show that if the
agent shares the manager’s vision, then communication incentives are more sen-
sitive to changes in exogenous rents. Speciﬁcally, incentive to reveal information
deteriorates relatively rapidly as private rent increases. As a result an informative
equilibrium breaks down sooner under shared values. The reason is that noisy in-
formation about project quality makes it less likely for the manager to implement
the project. Conditional on implementation, the agent infers that the manager’s
type is high. (For instance, he infers that the manager has a strong taste for aggres-
sive strategies). This boosts his incentive to inﬂate project quality even more, and
undermines the beneﬁt of a ﬁner partition.
Section 4.6 shows that the ability of an agent with shared values to use a ﬁne
partition depends on the common knowledge of manager’s type. Similar to the agent
without shared values, he now resorts to making a recommendation for or against
the project instead of using a ﬁne partition. However, he fully utilizes the manager’s
information in forming his recommendation. This strictly improves communication.
Moreover, the manager is willing to follow the recommendation, conditional on suf-
ﬁciently low rents of the agent. In case the project is implemented, the outcome
is biased towards the interest of the agent. Again, if rents are substantial, more
information is revealed from an agent who does not share the manager’s vision.
In section 4.7, we show that delegation of decision rights to the agent performs at
most as well as communication. From the viewpoint of the manager, communication
sometimes outperforms delegation and at other times communication is outcome
equivalent to conditional delegation. The reason is that the manager has private
information. He cannot circumvent communication altogether by means of delegation
to an agent with shared values. While an agent without shared values disregards the
manager’s information altogether.
Finally, in section 4.8, we analyze the agent’s incentives to collect information.
Here we assume that the manager is ex-ante informed. We show that an agent with
(without) shared values exerts higher eﬀort if his private rents are suﬃciently small
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(large). This is of course due to agent’s communication incentives.
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate culture and homogeneity of
preferences. Management literature, and a few studies in economics, show that man-
agerial vision is important for the development of an organization’s culture (Cre´mer,
1993; Lazear, 1995; Van den Steen, 2005, 2010a,b).4 It is well understood that homo-
geneity or strong culture has both costs and beneﬁts. Van den Steen (2010a) shows
that shared beliefs and values leads to more delegation, less monitoring, higher exe-
cution eﬀort, more communication, but also to less experimentation and information
collection. In this paper, we show that shared values do not necessarily lead to more
communication and information collection. If private rents from project implemen-
tation are substantial, then inﬂuence activities via manipulation of information are
likely to be high.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the theory of the ﬁrm. It high-
lights that communication costs are relevant for a ﬁrm’s make-or-buy decision. These
costs take the form of a loss of information due to noisy communication. The role of
information ﬂows or knowledge transfers has received little attention in the economic
literature on ﬁrm boundaries. Holmstro¨m and Roberts (1998) for instance point out
that ‘...leading economic theories of ﬁrm boundaries have paid almost no attention
to the role of organizational knowledge.’ The focus has largely been on tangible
goods, and hence on the hold-up problem and asset speciﬁcity. A few papers have
assumed that information transmission can be facilitated by vertical integration,
such as Malmgren (1961), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and Arrow (1975). How-
ever, the question of why information ﬂows are stronger within ﬁrms (or diﬃcult
across ﬁrms) has been sidestepped in the literature. We show that it is not trivial
to assume that integration can facilitate stronger information ﬂows. The justiﬁca-
tion we oﬀer relates closely to transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937, and Williamson,
1975, 1985), and adds to it by highlighting the nature of costs that eﬀect a ﬁrm’s
make-or-buy decision in relation to information ﬂows. The intuition is most clearly
applied to the consulting industry, where a primary beneﬁt of external consultants
is their detachment from the organization.5
4It should be noted that shared values diﬀers from shared beliefs, where the latter allows for
diﬀering priors along the lines of Aumann (1976). This paper only analyzes shared values. Moreover,
this paper also diﬀers from a related literature that deﬁnes culture as equilibrium selection in the
presence of multiple equilibria.
5In the context of this paper, the use of a management consultant is purely informational.
Consultants are of course hired for other reasons as well, for example to ﬁnd problems in organiza-
tions. Moreover, external consultants have exposure to numerous ﬁrms and industries which gives
them an informational advantage over internal employees of an organization. We do not take such
information asymmetries into account.
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Finally, the model in this paper is closely related to studies on cheap-talk with
a privately informed decision-maker (DM), and in particular to studies where the
information sets of the DM and the agent are non-overlapping. These studies show
mixed results of the eﬀect of the DM’s private information on communication. Some
show that it improves while others show that it has no eﬀect on communication.6 Re-
sults are mixed because communication from the agent depends on how information
translates into actions and payoﬀs. For instance, in Watson (1996) the agent receives
a perfect signal of the state but is confused about the ‘meaning’ of the signal. The
DM is privately informed about how to read the agent’s signal, but does not observe
the signal itself. He shows that full revelation of information from the agent may
be viable. Theoretically, the reason for this is that the agent in Watson (1996) only
cares about the decision that is taken while the DM cares about both the information
and the decision. My paper shows that the private information of a DM can improve
communication if, 1) the DM’s information has payoﬀ relevance to the agent, and
2) diﬀerent messages of the agent aﬀect diﬀerently how the DM translates his own
information into actions. That is, it requires that the agent is uncertain about his
payoﬀ conditional on his messages, and that diﬀerent messages induce diﬀerent levels
of signalling costs. Harris and Raviv (2008) extend the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model to one where the DM also has a private type. They show that communication
is unaﬀected. The reason is that the agent’s messages have no eﬀect on how the DM
utilizes his own information in the decision.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 4.2.
Players’ equilibrium strategies are derived in section 4.3. Equilibrium communication
is characterized and analyzed in section 4.4, followed by the ﬁrm’s make-or-buy
decision in section 4.5. The assumption that the manager’s information is private
knowledge is relaxed in 4.6. Delegation and incentives to collect information are
analyzed in sections 4.8 and 4.7, respectively. A brief discussion on factors inﬂuencing
a ﬁrm’s make-or-buy decision with respect to knowledge transfers is provided in
section 4.9. Finally, section 4.10 concludes the paper.
6In settings where information sets of the two players is over-lapping, the DM is typically as-
sumed to have a weak signal of the agent’s information. This typically deteriorates communication.
See for instance, Olszewski (2004), Lai (2014), Ishida and Shimizu (2009), De Barreda (2010).
7In their model, if the agent were to care slightly less about the DM’s type in comparison to his
own type, then communication will improve.
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4.2 Model
There are two players, a ﬁrm manager (M) and an agent (A). The manager (M)
must decide whether to implement a project (d = 1) or to maintain status quo
(d = 0). One can view this as an acquisition decision, or a decision to enter a new
market, or launch a new product.
The optimal decision for the manager depends on the quality of the project and
on the type (vision) of the manager. Denote by q ∈ Q the quality of the project, and
denote by t ∈ T the type of the manager, where Q and T are convex subsets of R.
Assume that q and t are independent random variables with cumulative distribution
functions Fq and Ft supported on Q and T , respectively.
The status quo (d = 0) yields a normalized payoﬀ to each player, uM (t, q, 0) =
uA (t, q, 0) = 0. If the project is implemented (d = 1), then M ’s payoﬀ is given by,
uM(t, q, 1) = t+ q (4.1)
This payoﬀ captures that managers may diﬀer in their vision about the right course
of action. M of high (low) type prefers implementation for a larger (smaller) range
of project quality. Of course, for any given M type, the better the project quality,
the higher are the returns from the project, or the more likely it is that M chooses
project implementation. As an example, a manager who is overconﬁdent or has a
preference for growth may choose to acquire another ﬁrm if the returns are not large
or are more uncertain, whereas a manager who is conservative may prefer to acquire
a ﬁrm only if the returns are high and less uncertain. Malmendier and Tate (2005,
2008), for instance, provide evidence that over-conﬁdent CEOs are signiﬁcantly more
likely to conduct value-destroying mergers.
I assume that the manager privately observes his type t, but is uninformed about
project quality, q. To learn the quality, M consults A who privately observes q. The
payoﬀ to A if the project is implemented (d = 1) is given by,
uA(t, q, 1) = b+ vt+ q (4.2)
Conﬂict in players’ preferences is captured by two parameters, v and b. Through-
out I assume that both parameters are common knowledge. The term v captures
the agent’s valuation of the manager’s vision. If A shares M ’s vision, then v = 1,
and if A does not share M ’s vision, then v = 0. I restrict attention to v ∈ {0, 1} for
simplicity.
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The term b > 0 captures a private beneﬁt that A derives from project imple-
mentation.8 A beneﬁt may exist for various reasons, such as intrinsic rewards or a
bonus. I compare the eﬀect of b on the quality of communication from an agent who
values M ’s type (v = 1) with the eﬀect of b quality of communication from an agent
who does not value M ’s type (v = 0).
The timing is as follows. Players ﬁrst learn their private information: M learns
t and A learns q. Then A sends a report to M containing information about q,
denoted by r ∈ R where R is a large space. Communication from A is cheap talk,
that is, the report is non-veriﬁable and costless to produce. After hearing report r,
M chooses d ∈ {0, 1}. Payoﬀs are then realized. Apart from the realizations of t and
q all aspects of the game are common knowledge.
I study Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBE). A pure PBE consists of a triple,
a reporting strategy for the agent denoted by r = ρ(q) ∈ R, a decision strategy for
the manager denoted by δ(t, r) ∈ {0, 1}, and beliefs denoted by G(q|r), such that:
(i) ρ(q) maximizes E(uA|δ(t, r)),
(ii) δ(t, r) maximizes E(uM |G(q|r)),
(iii) G(q|r) follows Bayes’ Rule on equilibrium path.
As is well known, a babbling equilibrium always exists in a game of cheap talk,
i.e. an equilibrium where all sender types pool together and use the same reporting
strategy. In this case, the receiver ignores any information contained in the message
and takes an action based on his prior belief about the sender’s information (q).
The analysis will focus on equilibria where cheap talk is inﬂuential, i.e. where some
information can be credibly transmitted by the sender.
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It is straightforward that the manager prefers d = 1 if the expected payoﬀ from imple-
mentation, uM(t, q, 1) = E(t+ q|r), is larger than the outside option, uM(t, q, 0) = 0.
Thus M chooses d = δ(t, r) = 1 if t > −E(q|r).9 The Lemma below follows.
Lemma 2. After a report r, the manager follows a threshold strategy such that he
chooses d = 1 if t > t∗(r) and chooses d = 0 otherwise, where t∗(r) = −E[q|r].
8b > 0 is without loss of generality. b < 0 is symmetric for all results.
9Without loss of generality attention is restricted to pure strategy equilibria.
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That is, M chooses to implement the project if his type is suﬃciently high given
his belief about project quality. The higher is his belief, the lower is the threshold
t∗(r), and the more likely it is that he chooses d = 1.
As is common in cheap talk models the exact reporting strategy of the sender is
not relevant. Rather it is the action induced in equilibrium that is relevant. The
action taken by the manager depends on his belief about q conditional on the report
of the agent. It is embodied in the threshold, t∗(r). The equilibrium report r = ρ(q)
sent by A induces t∗(ρ(q)) such that it maximizes E(uA|t∗(ρ(q))) for any q. The
following lemma shows that similar to Crawford and Sobel (1982), all equilibria of
the game are of the interval form.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium the agent follows an interval strategy such that ∃ a
ﬁnite set {qi} of marginal types, where qi−1 < qi, and all types q ∈ (qi−1, qi) pool by
sending a report ri.
Proof. See appendix.
In an interval equilibrium of size N , the agent partitions his information into
N intervals and only reveals which interval his information lies in.10 Denote the
boundaries of the intervals along an N -step partition of the support of q by qi for
all i ∈ {0, · · · , N} such that q0 < q1 < · · · < qN . Under this reporting strategy,
for each q in the interval (qi−1, qi) the agent reveals his information to belong to the
ith interval of the partition by sending a report ri. Attention can be restricted to
N distinct reports in an equilibrium of size N , where each report induces a distinct
action from M . Report ri induces action plan δ(t, ri) for all q ∈ (qi−1, qi). Denote the
equilibrium thresholds along the support of t by ti for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N} such that
t1 > · · · > tN . In equilibrium, higher reports are associated with lower thresholds.
4.4 Equilibrium Communication
To characterize equilibria, I assume from hereon that both t and q are independently
uniformly distributed over [−1, 1].11 For all i ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, the indiﬀerence
10This reporting strategy is equivalent to another strategy where for each q in an interval, C
randomizes his report over that interval.
11The assumption that t and q have the same support [−1, 1] restricts attention to interior
solutions, i.e. ti ∈ (−1, 1). If, for instance, the support of q is larger than the support of t, then
it is possible that t1 > 1 (or tN < −1). In this case, the lowest report induces d = 0 ∀t and the
remaining reports induce interior solutions as in proposition 6. Such corner solutions increase the
set of equilibria but add little insight to the discussion at hand.
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equation of A at boundary qi is given by E[u
A(ti, qi, 1)] = E[u
A(ti+1, qi, 1)],
1− ti
2
(
b+ v
1 + ti
2
+ qi
)
=
1− ti+1
2
(
b+ v
1 + ti+1
2
+ qi
)
which reduces to,
qi = −b− v
(
ti + ti+1
2
)
(4.3)
This indiﬀerence equation holds for both types of agents, v = 0 and v = 1. To
understand it better, I analyze them separately. I begin with an agent who shares
M ’s values (v = 1). The following proposition characterizes all equilibria with v = 1.
Proposition 6. Suppose b > 0 and v = 1. Then all equilibria are outcome equiv-
alent to one in which the maximum number of intervals N(b) used by the agent in
equilibrium is the maximum integer below
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
1 + 4
b
)
.
For any N ∈ {1, · · · , N(b)}, A sends a report r = ri if q ∈ (qi−1, qi), where q0 = −1
and qN = 1, and ∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1} the boundaries qi are determined by,
(qi+1 − qi) = (qi − qi−1) + 4b (4.4)
The manager implements the project (d = 1) after ri if t > ti and maintains status
quo otherwise, where ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} the threshold ti ∈ (−1, 1) is given by,
ti = −qi−1 + qi
2
(4.5)
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition implies that A truthfully reports the interval (qi−1, qi) in which
his information lies. The manager believes q = 1
2
(qi−1+qi), and chooses to implement
the project if and only if his own type is suﬃciently high. The intuition behind this
proposition entails two aspects. First, for any given q the agent with shared values
prefers d = 1 if t > −(b+ q) ≡ tC , while the manager prefers d = 1 if t > −q ≡ tM .
For all q, tC < tM due to A’s private beneﬁt b > 0. The implication is that for any
given q, A prefers implementation (d = 1) if t ∈ (tC , tM), while M prefers the status
quo (d = 0). Due to this conﬂict, A has an incentive to inﬂate his information and
induce M to choose d = 1 for t ∈ (tC , tM).
A, however, is uncertain about the manager’s type. This leads to the second
aspect. Inﬂating project quality comes at a cost to the agent. It induces some
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unfavorable M types to choose d = 1, that is some t < tC . The implication is that
A is not only uncertain whether his report will induce d = 0 or d = 1, but he is also
uncertain whether, in case of d = 1, the outcome will be favorable for him or not.
Together, these two aspects imply that the incentive compatibility constraint of
A at a boundary q = qi is given by equation (4.4).
12 It shows that for any two
adjacent intervals, the higher interval is longer than the lower interval. At q = qi,
A incurs a cost from both reports, low or high. Reporting low quality induces some
favorable M types to choose d = 0 (type II error). Reporting high quality induces
some unfavorable M types to choose d = 1 (type I error). If two adjacent intervals
are of equal length, then both reports are equally costly. In this case, A strictly
prefers to send the high report at boundary q = qi. Since a high report results in
a type I error, part of the cost is compensated by a positive beneﬁt b. The high
report, therefore, must entail a relatively higher cost. A wider interval is precisely
what creates such a cost. Figure 4.1 provides this intuition in an equilibrium with
three reports. The implementation region is shaded. A is indiﬀerent at q2 because
the expected cost is the same from either message. The two equilibrium thresholds,
t2 and t3, are equally far from his ﬁrst-best, t
C
q2
.
This outcome bears similarity to the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) model
(CS from hereon). In both models, the incentive to inﬂate information arises due
to an upward bias of the sender, and the resulting costs restrict this incentive. The
diﬀerence is that in the current model the costs are associated with the sender’s
uncertainty, where as in CS the sender is fully informed.13 Similar to CS, the equi-
librium with the highest number of words is preferred by both players’ as I show
later. The reason is that costs from noisy signalling are decreasing in N .
An interesting point to take from this equilibrium with an agent who values
M ’s private information is that A can partition his information into relatively ﬁne
intervals. This is unlike the typical model of cheap talk with a binary decision
where the payoﬀ relevant information is one-dimensional (the receiver does not have
a private type). The sender in those model can use a maximum of two intervals in
equilibrium. The following proposition shows that communication with agent who
does not value M ’s private information (v = 0) bears similarity to the typical model.
The indiﬀerence equation (4.3) with v = 0 reduces to qi = −b.
12Follows from substituting out ti and ti+1 from equation (4.3) with v = 1 using equation (4.5).
13The similarity of the incentive constraint (4.4) is coincidental. However, as in most cheap talk
games, the point to take from it is that higher messages are noisier than lower messages. Another
distinction is that in CS, actions are unbounded. In the current model, the thresholds (that deﬁne
the receiver’s action) are bounded (implementation probability lies in [0, 1]). This can result in
corner solutions (although I exclude these from my analysis).
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1
1
-1 q1 q2
0.87 = t1
0.4 = t2
0.5 = t3
−0.03 = tCq2
tM
tC
Figure 4.1: An equilibrium with an agent with shared values (v = 1): b = 0.1
Proposition 7. Suppose b > 0 and v = 0. Then, all equilibria are outcome equiv-
alent to one in which the agent uses a maximum of N = 2 reports in equilibrium,
r ∈ {r1, r2}.
A reports r = r1 if q ∈ [−q¯,−b), and reports r = r2 if q ∈ (−b, q¯ ].
For i ∈ {1, 2}, the manager implements the project (d = 1) after ri if t > ti and
maintains status quo otherwise, where the threshold ti ∈ (−1, 1) is given by,
t1 =
1 + b
2
and t2 = −1− b
2
(4.6)
The proposition implies that A makes a recommendation for or against project
implementation. The manager chooses to implement the project after a recommen-
dation if and only if his own information is suﬃciently high. The intuition for this
proposition is straightforward. The payoﬀ from d = 1 to an agent who does not
internalize M ’s information is given by, uA(t, q, 1) = b+ q. For all q > −b, A prefers
d = 1 irrespective of t, and makes a recommendation to implement the project. For
all q < −b, he recommends against project implementation. In other words, he has
no incentive to use a ﬁner partition. Unlike an agent with v = 1, uncertainty about
t does not restrict his incentive to inﬂate q. As before, M chooses d = 1 if t is
suﬃciently large. A is uncertain whether reporting high quality will lead to d = 1 or
d = 0, but he is not uncertain about his payoﬀ conditional on implementation. An
equilibrium is depicted in ﬁgure 4.2.
Note the diﬀerence from the typical cheap talk game with a binary decision where
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q1 = −0.1
0.55 = t1
−0.45 = t2
tM
Figure 4.2: An equilibrium with an agent who does not share values (v = 0): b = 0.1
only the sender has payoﬀ relevant information. In the standard setting, the sender
is able to persuade the decision maker to rubber-stamp his recommendation. He
achieves his ﬁrst-best outcome. As a result, the receiver has no real authority over
the decision. In the current model, M does not rubber-stamp the agent’s recom-
mendation. As a result, A does not achieve his ﬁrst-best outcome. M maintains real
authority over the decision (for both v = 0 and v = 1). The reason of course is that
M has a private type.
4.4.1 Quality of Communication
Propositions 6 and 7 show that there is a diﬀerence in the nature of communication
from an agent who values M ’s type. Such an agent has the ability to partition
his information into relatively ﬁne intervals, while an agent who does not value
M ’s type uses at most two intervals. As is well-known in cheap talk games, the
ﬁner is a partition (higher is N) the smaller is the loss of information due to noisy
communication. In this section, I show that an agent’s ability to use a relatively
ﬁner partition under shared values does not necessarily translate into better quality
of communication. In comparison, an agent without shared values may reveal more
precise information.14
14A note on equilibrium selection: with v = 1, multiple economically diﬀerent equilibria exist.
That is, an equilibrium exists for all N ∈ {1, · · · , N(b)}. In the appendix, I show that the expected
payoﬀ to both players, M and A, is increasing in N (and decreasing in b). Thus, I assume in
this section, where ever necessary, that players coordinate on the equilibrium with the maximum
intervals, i.e. on the partition of size N(b).
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Proposition 8. If b is suﬃciently small (large), then communication with v = 1
(v = 0) is more informative than communication with v = 0 (v = 1).
An N(b) > 1 equilibrium exists for v = 1 if b < 1
2
, and for v = 0 if b < 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Generally speaking, and consistent with the literature, the quality of communica-
tion deteriorates as b increases whether v = 0 or v = 1. However, the rate at which it
deteriorates from an agent with shared values (v = 1) is relatively higher. To see this
note that the incentive compatibility constraint in proposition 6 is a stronger restric-
tion than the incentive compatibility constraint in proposition 7. The indiﬀerence
equation of an agent with v = 1 requires that for any two adjoining intervals, the
high interval is suﬃciently wider than the low interval. In comparison, the incentive
constraint of an agent with v = 0 requires that there exist a second interval. Due
to this, an informative equilibrium under v = 1 breaks down quicker as b increases
than it does under v = 0. The former requires b < 1
2
, while the latter requires b < 1.
To put it another way, the private beneﬁt has a stronger inﬂuence on the incentive
of the agent with shared values to add noise in his messages. The boundaries along
a partition shift (towards left) at a greater rate with v = 1.15
The reason that communication with v = 1 deteriorates faster is as follows. As b
increases, A’s incentive to inﬂate project quality becomes stronger (the same as for
v = 0). The manager accordingly, becomes less inclined to implement the project.
M chooses d = 1 for a smaller range of t, or in other words, fewer types of M
choose d = 1. The implication is that conditional on implementation, the expected
type of the manager increases if the report is noisier. In other words, conditional
on implementation, A expects that M has a strong type (or vision). This further
adds to A’s incentive to inﬂate his information if he values M ’s type. The incentive
of the agent who does not value M ’s type remains unaﬀected by any change in the
expected type of M .
An agent with shared values can thus have stronger incentive to add noise in his
communication. In fact, the quality of communication with shared values can be
worse even if a relatively ﬁner partition is used, i.e. N(b) > 2. This is because the
highest message can be much noisier. In particular, if b ∈ (0.08, 0.17), the maximum
intervals with v = 1 is given by N(b) = 3. As b increases from b = 0.08, the width
the third interval increases and eventually becomes wider than the width of the high
15Speciﬁcally, with v = 0 the incentive is one-to-one, ∂∂b (q1) = −1. With v = 1, the incentive is
larger than one, ∂∂b (qk) = −2(N − 2k + 1).
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interval under v = 0. This happens if b > 0.11. The ﬁner partition however is still
more beneﬁcial. It becomes less eﬃcient if b > 0.14. An example is depicted in
ﬁgure 4.3, where b = 0.15. With v = 1, a partition with three intervals is deﬁned by
boundaries q1 = −0.93 and q2 = −0.27. With v = 0, a partition with two intervals
is deﬁned by boundary q1 = −0.15.
-1 1
-0.93 -0.27
-0.15
Figure 4.3: A partition of q with v = 1 (above line) that is less eﬃcient than the
partition with v = 0 (below line): b = 0.15.
4.5 Make or Buy?
The qualitative diﬀerence in communication that is analyzed in the previous section
eﬀects the manager’s make-or-buy decision. As mentioned in the introduction, agents
within an organization are likely to share similar beliefs and values. In this section, I
assume that an agent within the organization fully internalizes M ’s type, i.e. v = 1.
An external agent, such as a management consultant, does not value the manager’s
type, v = 0. The expected payoﬀ to M if A values M ’s type (v = 1) is given by,
EUM(v = 1) =
1
4
N∑
i=1
∫ 1
ti
∫ qi
qi−1
(t+ q)dqdt
=
1
12N2
[
4N2 − 1− (N2 − 1)N2b2] (4.7)
and his expected payoﬀ if A does not value M ’s type (v = 0) is given by,
EUM(v = 0) =
1
4
2∑
i=1
∫ 1
ti
∫ qi
qi−1
(t+ q)dqdt
=
1
16
(
5− b2) (4.8)
Subtracting equation (4.8) from (4.7) gives us,
1
48N2
(
(N2 − 4)−N2b2(4N2 − 7)) (4.9)
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Clearly, the manager’s payoﬀ in both cases is decreasing in b, which is consistent
with any cheap talk game. It can be veriﬁed that expression (4.9) is positive for
N > 3, and negative for N < 3. For N = 3, it is positive if b < 0.14. Thus, internal
communication dominates external communication if and only if b < 0.14. Figure
4.4 summarizes the above for all b ∈ [0, 1].
The implication of our analyses is straightforward. Costs due to noisy communi-
cation, or information losses, are relevant for a ﬁrm’s make-or-buy decision. Commu-
nication inside organizations may generate larger costs, due to which a manager may
prefer to buy information from agents that are detached from the organization. In
particular, these results predict that projects which generate relatively large private
rents for the agent are more likely to be outsourced.
b 0 1
0.50.170.140.08
if v = 0 N = 2
if v = 1 N(b) > 3 N(b) = 3 N(b) = 2 BABBLING
Quality
& EUM
v = 1 dominates v = 0 dominates
Figure 4.4: Quality of communication and manager’s payoﬀ for all b ∈ [0, 1].
4.6 Common Knowledge of Manager’s Vision
In this section I analyze how the previous discussion hinges on the assumption that
the manager’s type is private information. Assume that the agent fully observes the
manager’s information, i.e. t is common knowledge.
First consider the agent who does not value M ’s type (v = 0). His incentive to
communicate does not depend on t, as shown in proposition 7. It is straightforward
that observing the manager’s type has no aﬀect on his incentive to communicate.
The only diﬀerence is that A is not uncertain whether his report will induce M to
choose d = 1 or d = 0.
On the other hand, if the agent values M ’s type (v = 1), then his communication
incentives do depend on the manager’s type. The following proposition characterizes
the equilibria.
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Proposition 9. Assume b > 0, v = 1, and t is common knowledge. Then all
equilibria are outcome equivalent to one in which the agent, for any given realization
of t, uses a maximum of N = 2 reports in equilibrium, r ∈ {r1, r2}.
C sends r = r1 if q ∈ [−1, q1(t)) to recommend M to choose d = 0, and he sends
r = r2 if q ∈ (q1(t), 1 ] to recommend d = 1, where boundary q1(t) is given by,
q1(t) = −b− t
M follows A’s recommendation if b < t+ 1, and otherwise chooses d = 0.
The above proposition shows that if an agent values M ’s type and is informed
about it, then his communication strategy bears similarity to the strategy of an
agent who does not value M ’s type. Both kinds of agents make a recommendation
for or against the project. However, unlike the agent with v = 0, an agent with
v = 1 conditions his recommendation on the realization of t. In other words, he
fully utilizes the manager’s type in forming his recommendation. As a result, the
manager is willing to follow the recommendation. Notice however, that only some
types of M are willing to rubber-stamp A’s recommendation. The reason is that the
ﬁnal decision is biased towards the interest of A, who achieves his ﬁrst-best outcome.
Due to the biased outcome, only types t > b − 1 are willing to rubber-stamp A’s
recommendation. The manager again maintains some control over the ﬁnal decision.
Figure 4.5 depicts a communication equilibrium for b = 0.2. The players’ ﬁrst-
best outcomes are depicted as before by the diagonals. For any given t, A recom-
mends to implement the project if q lies above diagonal tC , and recommends to
maintain status quo otherwise. All M types t > t∗ = b − 1 = −0.8 follow the
recommendation, and all M types t < t∗ choose d = 0.
Notice that a report from A with shared values now reveals less about project
quality, in comparison to communication if t is private information. M only learns
whether q is above q1(t). However, reports now reveal more precisely whether project
quality is suﬃciently good for a given type of the manager. The following comparison
shows that M is strictly better oﬀ if A observes t in comparison to if he does not
observe t. M ’s expected payoﬀ if A with v = 1 observes t is given by,
EUM(v = 1) =
1
4
∫ 1
b−1
∫ 1
−b−t
(t+ q)dqdt
=
1
12
(2− b)2(1 + b) (4.10)
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t∗ = −0.8
tM
tC
Figure 4.5: An equilibrium if A observes M ’s type and values it (v = 1).
Subtracting (4.7) from equation (4.10) gives us,
1
12N2
(N2b3 +N2(N2 − 4)b2 + 1) (4.11)
which is positive for all N ≥ 2.
The reason thatM is better oﬀ if the agent observes t is that A with shared values
can fully utilize information about t in his recommendation. The gains associated
with this are suﬃciently large to compensate for the biasedness of the ﬁnal outcome.16
Finally, in line with our results on the quality of communication and the man-
ager’s make-or-buy decision,M only conditionally prefers to receive information from
an agent with shared values. Subtracting equation (4.8) from equation (4.10) gives
us,
1
48
(
4b3 − 9b2 + 1) (4.12)
It can be veriﬁed that this expression is positive if and only if b < 0.36. Thus,
communication from an agent with v = 1 is more informative if b is not too large, but
it is more informative with v = 0 if b is substantial. Again, projects that generate
relatively large private rents to the agent are likely to be outsourced.
16The logic is similar to the one in the delegation literature where communication is less eﬃcient
than delegation even though delegation leads to a biased outcome.
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4.7 Delegation
In the previous sections we have analyzed incentives of the agent to communicate his
information, and the manager’s payoﬀs under communication. Dessein (2002) shows
for the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model that delegation of decision rights to the
agent improves outcomes over communication because information is better utilized
in the ﬁnal decision. In this section we analyze whether delegation is beneﬁcial for
the manager also in our model. We show that M cannot do better under delegation
in comparison to communication.
In our model, it is trivial to note that the manager will not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to delegate the decision to an agent without shared values (v = 0). The reason is
that such an agent will not utilize any information that the manager possesses. This
holds whether M ’s information is private knowledge or common knowledge.17
It remains to determine whether M will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to delegate the decision
to an agent who shares his values (v = 1). It turns out that delegation under v = 1
has no eﬀect on the ﬁnal outcome if the M ’s information is private knowledge. The
reason is that a privately informed M cannot circumvent communication by delegat-
ing decision rights. Instead, M must communicate his information to the agent, who
then makes the ﬁnal decision. The simplest way to see that delegation will not alter
the outcome is to note that A’s beneﬁt b is a normalization and communication in-
centives of M will be symmetric to those of A. This equivalence is formally provided
by Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2013). They analyze a cheap-talk communication game
between a board and management that is similar to the communication game with
v = 1 of this paper.
If M ’s information is common knowledge, then communication under shared
values is outcome equivalent to conditional delegation. This is trivially seen from
proposition 9. There we have shown that M follows the agent’s recommendation if
b < t+1, and otherwise chooses to maintain status quo. If M follows A’s recommen-
dation, then A achieves his ﬁrst-best outcome. In other words, under communication
the project is implemented if b + t + q > 0 conditional on b < t + q. If instead A
has decision rights, then he will prefer to implement the project if E(b+ t+ q) > 0.
The implication is that full delegation is sub-optimal for the manager in comparison
to communication. M will prefer to delegate the decision if and only if b < t + 1.
The outcome however, will be equivalent to communication. Thus, in our model
delegation of decision rights performs at most as well as communication.
17M ’s payoﬀ under delegation to A with v = 0 is given by, 4−4b
2
16 . Compare with equation 4.8.
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4.8 Incentives to Collect Information
In the previous sections we have analyzed communication incentives. In this section,
we analyze players’ incentives to collect information. I restrict attention to a simple
scenario and assume that M observes t and only A has to exert eﬀort to learn q.
This allows a simple comparison of the eﬀort exerted by the two kinds of agents.
The baseline model can be easily extended to include a stage in which A has to
exert costly eﬀort to learn q. The timing is as follows. Nature determines t and
q, and reveals t to M . In stage 1, A exerts eﬀort πAj to learn q. In stage 2, the
communication game of section 4.2 takes place. Payoﬀs are then realized.
Assume a quadratic cost of eﬀort that is given by 1
2
λ(πAj )
2. Parameter λ > 0
captures the marginal cost of eﬀort to A. I assume for simplicity that λ is common
knowledge, and that both kinds of agents, v = 1 and v = 0, have the same marginal
cost of eﬀort. Term πAj ∈ [0, 1] denotes the eﬀort exerted by A, where the subscript
j = v ∈ {0, 1} distinguishes the eﬀort of A with v = 1 from the eﬀort of A with
v = 0.18 Eﬀort πAj determines the probability with which A becomes informed.
If A exerts eﬀort, then he successfully learns q with probability πAj , and remains
uninformed with probability 1 − πAj . If A is uninformed, then he sends an empty
message, m = φ, which is equivalent to babbling.
The expected payoﬀ to the agent with v = 1 and v = 0 is respectfully given by,
EUA(v = 1) = πA1
(
1
4
N∑
i=1
∫ 1
ti
∫ qi
qi−1
(b+ t+ q)dqdt
)
+ · · ·
+ (1− πA1 )
(
1
4
∫ 1
−1
∫ 1
−1
(b+ t+ q)dqdt
)
− 1
2
λ(πA1 )
2 (4.13)
EUA(v = 0) = πA0
(
1
4
2∑
i=1
∫ 1
ti
∫ qi
qi−1
(b+ q)dqdt
)
+ · · ·
+ (1− πA0 )
(
1
4
∫ 1
−1
∫ 1
−1
(b+ q)dqdt
)
− 1
2
λ(πA0 )
2 (4.14)
The ﬁrst (second) term on the right is the expected payoﬀ if A ﬁnds (does not
ﬁnd) information, and the last term is the cost of eﬀort. Notice that in case A
18I assume for simplicity that eﬀort is observable, also that players observe whether the other
player is informed or not. This does not eﬀect our results since in our model a player does not have
incentive to conceal whether he is informed or uninformed.
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does not ﬁnd information, then an informed M prefers to implement the project if
t + E(q) > 0. The ﬁrst-order-conditions of equation 4.13 and equation 4.14 with
respect to πA1 and π
A
0 respectfully, imply that
πA1 =
(N2 − 1)(1−N2b2)
12λN2
(4.15)
πA0 =
1− b2
16λ
(4.16)
The higher is λ and b, the lower is the eﬀort exerted by both kinds of agents.
It is not so obvious whether πA1 is larger or smaller than π
A
0 since an increase in b
results in a decrease in N . Figure 4.6 depicts the eﬀort levels under v = 1 and v = 0
as a function of b. The two curves intersect at b = 0.14. As can be seen, πA1 is larger
(smaller) than πA0 if b is suﬃciently small (large). Notice that the eﬀort of an agent
with shared values decreases (πA1 → 0) at a higher rate as b increases.19 The reason
is that communication incentives of such an agent are more sensitive to b, as shown
in the previous analysis. In fact, if the marginal cost of eﬀort is the same for both
types of agents, then πA1 is relatively higher for the same range of b for which an
agent with shared values reveals more information to M . The implication is that an
agent with shared values does not necessarily exert higher eﬀort to become informed.
Above we assumed that marginal costs of collecting information are symmetric.
This is likely not the case in reality. If an agent has a smaller (higher) marginal
cost, then his eﬀort is higher (the curve in ﬁgure 4.6 will shift up for all b). Whether
agents within an organization have a larger (or smaller) marginal cost of collecting
information in comparison to external management consultants is likely to depend
on various factors. First, marginal costs will depend on the type of information that
is required by the manager. For example, management consultants interact with
numerous ﬁrms and industries, due to which they are likely to have easier access to
information about consumer demand, best practices, and international markets. On
the other hand, internal agents are likely to have easier access to information about
the ﬁrm. Second, marginal costs of eﬀort will also depend on concerns related to
multi-tasking. An worker in the organization is likely to have a higher λ if doing so
pulls him away from other tasks.
In the analysis above, we assumed that M ’s information, t, is private knowledge.
In section ?? we showed that if t is common knowledge, then communication from an
agent with shared values is strictly better than if t is private knowledge. Moreover,
19As can also be seen from the partial derivative of equilibrium eﬀorts with respect to b.
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Figure 4.6: Agent’s eﬀort, πA1 and π
A
0 , as a function of b.
A achives his ﬁrst-best outcome in case the project is implemented. If A is able
to achieve his ﬁrst-best outcome (conditionally), then it is likely that A will have
stronger incentives to become informed. Indeed, this is true in our model. If A
observes t, then his expected payoﬀ is given by,
EUA(v = 1) = πA1
(
1
4
∫ 1
b−1
∫ 1
−b−t
(b+ t+ q)dqdt
)
+ · · ·
+ (1− πA1 )
(
1
4
∫ 1
−1
∫ 1
−1
(b+ t+ q)dqdt
)
− 1
2
λ(πA1 )
2 (4.17)
The ﬁrst-order-condition with respect to πA1 implies,
πA1 =
2 + (6− 7b)b2
24λ
(4.18)
It can be veriﬁed that equation 4.18 is strictly larger than the eﬀort levels given
in equations 4.15 and 4.16. Note that this is in line with Aghion and Tirole (1997).
If the agent is able to achieve his ﬁrst-best (even if conditionally so as in our model),
then it motivates the agent to exert higher eﬀort. An implication of these results is
that a manager will have incentive to reveal his information to an agent if doing so
will improve the incentives of A to collect information. To put it another way, M
can motivate an agent to exert higher eﬀort by communicating with the agent. Note
that this mechanism diﬀers from the mechanism in Aghion and Tirole (1997). There,
it is primarily delegation of decision rights that motivates the agent. Whether M
can credibly reveal his information fully to A is question for future research.
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4.9 Discussion
This paper provides a rationale for communication to diﬀer internally (within ﬁrms)
and externally (across ﬁrms). In the context of consultancy services, and more
broadly in the context of knowledge transfers, other factors may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s
make-or-buy decision. Clearly, the frequency of the need for this service is important.
A ﬁrm that requires a consultant’s advice rarely has smaller incentive to integrate
the service within the ﬁrm. Below I brieﬂy discuss some other aspects relevant for a
ﬁrm’s decision to integrate services related to knowledge transfers within the ﬁrm.
First, external consultant’s have a relatively stronger information advantage with
respect to competitive best practices in the industry and market characteristics. This
is due to their interaction with numerous ﬁrms and markets. Thus, a downside of
an internal consultant is relatively smaller exposure. This is relevant particularly
when an organization requires a consultant’s guidance on how to improve strategy
or workspace productivity. A model of project selection will be useful to analyze
how an external consultant’s information advantage and an internal consultant’s
proximity advantage eﬀect a ﬁrm’s choice over the make-or-buy decision.
Second, costs associated with information ﬂows or knowledge transfers are not
limited to those arising from noisy communication. Market transactions give out-
siders access to valuable information, particularly information that gives an organiza-
tion its competitive edge in the market. Thus, a disadvantage of market transaction
relates to loss in the value of information. It requires a ﬁrm to implicitly share its
knowledge with actual or potential competitors. From the society’s point of view
this need not be a bad thing. There is a positive externality on the market due
to the dispersion of competitive best practices. Moreover, it may increase a ﬁrm’s
incentive to further innovate. However, it can also be socially ineﬃcient since it
can discourage incentives to exert eﬀort into research and development, and increase
incentive to free-ride, or imitate, competitors. Whether this is socially eﬃcient or
not is a question for future research.
Third, the decision to use an external and internal consultant is not so black and
white. Organizations can, and often do, make use of internal and external agents.
Whether this combines the best of both worlds and improves outcomes, by way of
market discipline, or whether it worsens communication incentives is also a ques-
tion for future research. Typically, competition tends to improve communication,
however this is not necessary. Krishna and Morgan (2001), for instance, show that
consulting two experts who are biased in the same direction is never beneﬁcial over
4.10 Conclusion 57
a single expert. Finally, concerning incentives to collect information, agency prob-
lems are likely to be central similar to the choice of using an external sales agent
or creating an internal sales force, such as in Anderson (2008), and Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1991, 1994). If eﬀort is unobservable, the use of internal and external
consultants together can create tensions related to free-riding and measurement of
eﬀort to become informed.
4.10 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the incentives of an agent to communication with an
informed decision maker, such as a ﬁrm manager who has a personal view about the
right course of action. Our objective was to analyze how the agent’s valuation for the
decision maker’s information eﬀects his communication incentives. We have derived
four main results. First, if the agent values the decision maker’s information, then
the agent has incentive to ﬁne-tune his information and reveals relatively precise
information. Second, we have shown that communication incentives of an agent are
more sensitive to changes in private rents if the agent values the decision maker’s
information. If rents are suﬃciently small (large), then he reveals more information
if he values (does not value) the decision maker’s information. Third, we have
shown that if the decision maker has private information, then delegation performs
at most as well as communication. The fourth result concerns the agent’s incentives
to collect information. In line with the communication result, we ﬁnd that if rents
are suﬃciently small (large), then an agent exert’s relatively higher eﬀort if he values
(does not value) the decision maker’s information.
These results imply that communication costs are relevant for a ﬁrm’s make-
or-buy decision concerning knowledge transfers. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm may prefer to
buy advice from external sources who are detached from the organization, instead
of relying on information from workers in the organization.

Chapter 5
Summary
Three essays on strategic communication are discussed in this dissertation. These
essays consider diﬀerent settings in which a decision maker has to rely on another
agent for information. In each essay, we analyze how much information the sender
is able to credibly communicate to the decision maker, and to what extent, if at
all, the sender is able to inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome towards his own interest by
communicating strategically.
The ﬁrst essay addresses whether relatively stronger parties, in terms of ability to
collect information, have a disproportionate inﬂuence on decisions. If information is
veriﬁable and costly to acquire, then our model predicts that relatively powerful in-
terest groups frequently provide information that shapes policy. However, our model
also predicts that if powerful interest groups do not provide information, decisions
are made against their interests. In expected terms, these eﬀects cancel out and as
a result the ﬁnal decision does not depend on the relative strength of the parties.
This result is a benchmark. Lobbying groups may systematically aﬀect policies in
case the assumptions underlying our model are violated. For instance, the ability of
the decision maker to correctly estimate the strength of parties matters. Underesti-
mation of the strong party’s ability will bias the decision in its favor. Clearly, if the
decision maker is biased or can be bribed, then the ﬁnal decision is also biased.
The second essay addresses whether bureaucrats can inﬂuence the provision of
public goods towards their own interests. If information supplied by the bureaucrat
eﬀects multiple decisions concerning a project, then we show that concerning the size
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of public projects, information asymmetry and misaligned preferences do not lead
to distortions in expected terms. Bureaucrats try to exaggerate the demand for a
public service, but rational politicians see through their attempts. However, we also
show that bureaucrats are able to increase the likelihood of the provision of a public
service. Politicians implement projects they would not implement if they were fully
informed themselves. Together these two results predict that public swimming pools,
libraries, parks or museums, are not too large or too luxurious on average, but that
there are too many of them.
The ﬁnal essay addresses whether shared values in an organization lead to better
communication and less inﬂuence activities inside organizations. We adopt a setting
in which the decision maker has some information that the agent is uninformed about,
but he has to rely on the agent for some other information. We show that if the
agent cares about the information of the decision maker, and thus shares the values
of the decision maker, then he has strong incentives to reveal his own information
and does so relatively precisely. If the agent does not care about the information of
the decision maker, then his communication incentives are weak and he only reveals
whether or not he favors the implementation a project. However, we also show that
with shared values the incentives to reveal information are more sensitive to changes
in the agent’s private rents, such as intrinsic rewards. If these rents are suﬃciently
large, then less information is revealed with shared values. Our model predicts that
ﬁrm managers are more likely to use external management consultants for advice on
larger projects, and rely on in-house advice for relatively smaller projects.
These essays contribute to the theoretical literature on signaling games. Some
of the conventional assumptions in the literature are relaxed to gain a better under-
standing of factors that eﬀect communication incentives. The details are left to the
main text. Broadly speaking we show that communication deteriorates if the deci-
sion maker has to make multiple decisions and communication potentially improves
if the decision maker has private information. Interestingly, they also show that if
the preferences of the decision maker and the agent are not perfectly aligned, then
the decision maker sometimes prefers that the conﬂict exists across many dimensions
of the decision problem instead of only in one dimension.
Chapter 6
Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie bevat drie essays over strategische communicatie. De essays bescho-
uwen verschillende situaties waarin een beslisser een beroep moet doen op een andere
agent om informatie te krijgen. In ieder hoofdstuk analyseren we hoeveel informatie
de verzender (de agent) geloofwaardig kan communiceren naar de beslisser. En we
analyseren in welke mate de verzender in staat is de uitkomst te benvloeden in haar
eigen voordeel door strategisch te communiceren.
Het eerste essay bestudeert of relatief sterkere partijen, in termen van vermogen
om informatie te verzamelen, een disproportioneel grote invloed hebben of beslissin-
gen. Ons model voorspelt dat, als informatie veriﬁeerbaar is en kostbaar is om te ver-
werven, relatief sterkere belangengroepen vaak informatie leveren die beleid vormt.
Echter, ons model voorspelt ook dat als sterkere belangengroepen geen informatie
leveren, beslissingen worden gemaakt die niet in hun belang zijn. Naar verwacht-
ing heﬀen deze eﬀecten elkaar op en hangt de uiteindelijke beslissing niet af van
de relatieve macht van de partijen. Dit resultaat is een benchmark. Lobbygroepen
kunnen systematisch beleid benvloeden wanneer the onderliggende assumpties van
het model worden geschonden. Bijvoorbeeld, het vermogen van de beslisser om de
macht van de partijen juist in te schatten. Onderschatting van de sterkere partij
zorgt voor een afwijking van de beslissing in het voordeel van de sterkere partij.
Als de beslisser bevooroordeeld is of kan worden omgekocht, dan is de uiteindelijke
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beslissing ook afwijkend van de optimale beslissing.
Het tweede essay bestudeert of bureaucraten de voorziening van publieke goed-
eren kunnen benvloeden in hun eigen voordeel. We zien dat met betrekking tot de
grootte van publieke projecten, informatie asymmetrie en uiteenlopende voorkeuren
in verwachte termen niet leiden tot verstoringen, wanneer informatie die aangeboden
wordt door een bureaucraat meerdere beslissingen benvloedt. Bureaucraten proberen
de vraag naar publieke goederen te overdrijven, maar rationele politici doorzien hun
pogingen hiertoe. We laten echter ook zien dat bureaucraten in staat zijn om de
kans op de voorziening van publieke goederen te verhogen. Politici implementeren
projecten die ze niet zouden implementeren als ze volledig genformeerd zouden zijn.
Tezamen voorspellen deze twee resultaten dat publieke zwembaden, bibliotheken,
parken en musea gemiddeld niet te groot of te luxueus zijn, maar dat er hier wel te
veel van zijn.
Het laatste essay bestudeert of gedeelde waarden in een organisatie leiden tot
betere communicatie binnen organisaties. We bestuderen een setting waarin de
beslisser private informatie heeft, en op de agent moet vertrouwen voor andere in-
formatie. We laten zien dat als de agent geeft om de informatie van de beslisser,
hij sterke prikkels heeft om zijn informatie te onthullen en dat relatief precies doet.
Als de agent niet geeft om de informatie van de beslisser, dan zijn de communicatie
prikkels van de agent zwak, en onthult hij alleen of hij wel of niet voor implemen-
tatie van het project is. Echter, we laten ook zien dat met gedeelde waarden de
prikkels om informatie te onthullen meer gevoelig zijn voor veranderingen in de pri-
vate belangen, zoals intrinsieke beloningen. Als deze belangen groot genoeg zijn, dan
wordt er minder informatie onthult wanneer de beslisser en agent dezelfde waarden
hebben. Ons model voorspelt dat managers van bedrijven meer geneigd zijn om ex-
terne management consultants om advies te vragen bij grotere projecten, en in-house
consultants voor advies te vragen bij relatief kleinere projecten.
Deze essays dragen bij aan de theoretische literatuur van signalling games. Som-
mige van de conventionele aannames in de literatuur zijn versoepeld om beter inzicht
te krijgen in factoren die invloed hebben op communicatie prikkels. De details zijn te
lezen in de hoofdstukken. Maar in het algemeen laten deze essays zien dat commu-
nicatie verslechterd als de beslisser meerdere beslissingen moet maken, en commu-
nicatie mogelijk verbeterd als de beslisser private informatie heeft. Verder laten de
essays zien dat als de voorkeuren van de beslisser en de agent niet perfect bij elkaar
aansluiten, de beslisser wil dat de voorkeuren verschillen over meerdere dimensies in
plaats van over een dimensie.
Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
As mentioned in the model section, we assume λi >
1
2
(h − l) to ensure that both
parties have an incentive to acquire information. If λi ≤ 12(h − l), then πi = 1 and
the decision maker relies entirely on party i. To see this, suppose λi ≤ 12(h − l).
Suppose that if ma = φ, then μ
T = l. Then, party a chooses πa so as to maximize,
πa
1
2
(h+ l) + (1− πa)l − 1
2
λa(πa)
2
yielding,
1
2
(h− l) = λaπa
Then, πa = 1 for λa ≤ 12(h− l).
Proof of Proposition 2.
First we show μT is decreasing in πa and increasing in πb. Equation (2.8) solves for,
μT =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
πb−πa
(
h(1− πa−)− l(1− πb)− (h− l)
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)
)
if πa 	= πb
1
2
(h+ l) if πa = πb
(A.1)
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This implies,
∂μT
∂πa
=
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)
(πb − πa)2(1− πa)
(
πa + πb + 2
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)− 2
)
The ﬁrst term is positive. We need to show, (πa+πb+2
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)− 2) < 0:
πa + πb + 2
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)− 2 < 0
4(πa − 1)(πb − 1) < (2− πa − πb)2
4(πa − 1)(πb − 1)− (2− πa − πb)2 < 0
−(πa − πb)2 < 0
Thus, ∂μ
T
∂πa
< 0. Symmetry implies, ∂μ
T
∂πb
> 0.
Next we can show that πa > πb ⇔ μT < 12(l + h):
⇒: Assume πa > πb. Let μT = 12(l + h) + e, so e < 0 implies μT < 12(l + h).
Substituting in (A.1) gives us,
1
πb − πa
(
h(1− πa−)− l(1− πb)− (h− l)
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)
)
=
1
2
(l + h) + e
1
πa − πb
(
πa + πb + 2
√
(πa − 1)(πb)− 1− 2
)
= e
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is positive, and the second is negative. Thus, if
πa > πb, then e < 0 which implies μ
T < 1
2
(l + h).
⇐: Assume μT < 1
2
(l + h). Then (A.1) implies,
1
πb − πa
(
h(1− πa−)− l(1− πb)− (h− l)
√
(1− πa)(1− πb)
)
<
1
2
(l + h)
1
πa − πb
(
πa + πb + 2
√
(πa − 1)(πb)− 1− 2
)
< 0
Since the second term on the left-hand side is negative, we must have πa > πb.
Lastly, we show that λa < λb ⇔ μT < 12(l + h).
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⇐: Assume μT < 1
2
(l + h). This implies πa − πb > 0, thus,
(h− μT )2
2λa(h− l) −
(μT − l)2
2λb(h− l) > 0
λb(h− μT )2 − λa(μT − l)2 > 0
λb(h− 1
2
(l + h)− e)2 − λa(1
2
(l + h) + e− l)2 > 0
(λb − λa)
(
h− l + 2e
2
)2
> 0 =⇒ λb > λa
⇒: Assume λa < λb. Similar to the last derivation we obtain,
πa − πb = 1
2(h− l)λaλb (e)
2(λb − λa) > 0
Thus, if λa < λb then πa > πb, which implies μ
T < 1
2
(l + h).
Proof of Proposition 3.
We need to show that E(x) = E(μ). For simplicity, assume h = −l. This does
not alter our results. In fact, below we show that this result holds for any general
distribution function. If h = −l, then equation (2.8) implies that μT is implicitly
determined by,
(μT )2(πa − πb) + 2μTh(2− πa − πb) + h2(πa − πb) = 0 (A.2)
We need to show E(x) = E(μ) = h+l
2
= 0.
E(x) =πaπbE(μ) + πa(1− πb)
(
E(μ|μ > μT ) + μ
T − l
h− l μ
T
)
+ · · ·
πb(1− πa)
(
E(μ|μ < μT ) + h− μ
T
h− l μ
T
)
+ (1− πa)(1− πb)μT (A.3)
Substituting out E(μ) = 0, E(μ|μ > μT ) = h−μT
h−l
μT+h
2
, and E(μ|μ < μT ) = μT−l
h−l
μT+l
2
,
and reducing the expression gives us,
E(x) =
1
4h
(
(μT )2(πa − πb) + 2μTh(2− πa − πb) + h2(πa − πb)
)
Using expression (A.2), implies that E(x) = 0.
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General distribution: Here we show that this result also holds for the general
distribution function. Assume that the random variable μ has a probability density
function f(μ). Let p = Pr(μ > μT ) =
∫ h
μT
f(μ)d(μ). For this general case, equation
(2.8) is given by,
μT =
πaπb(1− p)E(μ|μ < μT ) + πb(1− πa)pE(x|μ > μT ) + (1− πa)(1− πb)E(μ)
πaπb(1− p) + πb(1− πa)p+ (1− πa)(1− πb)
(A.4)
which implies that the threshold is implicitly determined by the following,
[1− pπa − (1− p)πb]μT =πa(1− πb)(1− p)E(μ|μ < μT ) + · · ·
πb(1− πa)pE(μ|μ > μT ) + (1− πa)(1− πb)E(μ) (A.5)
Similarly, for the general case, the ﬁnal decision in expectation is given by,
E(x) =πaπbE(μ) + πa(1− πb)
[
pE(μ|μ > μT ) + (1− p)μT ]+ · · ·
πb(1− πa)
[
(1− p)E(μ|μ < μT ) + (1− p)μT ]+ (1− πa)(1− πb)μT (A.6)
which can be rewritten as,
E(x) =πaπbE(μ) + πa(1− πb)pE(μ|μ > μT ) + πb(1− πa)(1− p)E(μ|μ < μT ) · · ·
+ [1− pπa − (1− p)πb]μT (A.7)
The last term in this expression can be substituted out using equation A.5. Equation
A.7 reduces to,
E(x) = E(μ) + (πa + πb − 2πaπb)
[
pE(μ|μ > μT ) + (1− p)E(μ|μ < μT )− E(μ)]
(A.8)
Note that E(x) = E(μ) if the second term on the right hand side equals zero. This
follows directly from the law of total expectation, which states that we must have,
pE(μ|μ > μT ) + (1− p)E(μ|μ < μT ) = E(μ), and thus, E(x) = E(μ).
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Proof of Lemma 1.
We proceed in three steps. In step one, we show that if a message induces x = 0,
then this message must be the ﬁrst message (lowest interval). In step two, we prove
the interval strategy of the sender. In step three, we derive the border of the intervals
that deﬁne the sender’s strategy.
Step 1: We prove by contradiction that if a message induces x = 0, then this
message must be the ﬁrst message (lowest interval). Let there be sender types v and
w, where v < w. Let v send a message mv that induces his most preferred actions
in equilibrium, (x = 1, d = dv). Let w send a message mw that induces his most
preferred actions in equilibrium, (x = 0, d = 0). This implies:
i) US(1, d
v, v) = v − |dv − (v + b)| > US(0, 0, v) = a− (v + b) :
2v − |dv − (v + b)| > a− b (A.9)
ii) US(1, d
v, w) = w − |dv − (w + b)| > US(0, 0, w) = a− (w + b) :
2w − |dv − (w + b)| < a− b (A.10)
Together, expressions (A.9) and (A.10) imply, |dv − (v + b)| < |dv − (w + b)|. Since
dv > 0, b > 0, and v < w, we have a contradiction. Thus, it cannot be that a type v
prefers x = 1 and a type w > v prefers x = 0.
Step two: We show that the sender follows an interval strategy. We will show
that if two types prefer to send a message that induces the same actions in equilib-
rium, then all types in between these two types will also prefer to induce the same
actions in equilibrium. That is, all types that induce the same actions (x, d) in equi-
librium, must form a convex set. We prove by contradiction. Let there be sender
types v and w, where v < w. Let v and w send a message mv that induces their most
preferred actions in equilibrium, (x = xv, d = dv). Now let there be a type t′, such
that v < t′ < w. Let t′ send a message m′ that induces his most preferred action
(x = x′, d = d′). The preference of each type over the two messages imply that,
US(x
v, dv, v) > US(x
′, d′, v) (A.11)
US(x
v, dv, w) > US(x
′, d′, w) (A.12)
US(x
v, dv, t′) < US(x′, d′, t′) (A.13)
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We need to show that in equilibrium xv = x′ and dv = d′. We prove by contradiction.
Assume that xv 	= x′ and/or dv 	= d′. We consider the diﬀerent cases.
Case A: Assume xv 	= x′ and dv 	= d′: Assume mv induces the status quo,
(xv = 0, dv = 0), and m′ induces implementation, (x = 1, d = d′). Expressions
(A.11), (A.12), and (A.13) respectively imply that,
a− (v + b) > v − |d′ − (v + b)| =⇒ (d′ − v − b)2 − (2v + b− a)2 > 0 (A.14)
a− (w + b) > v − |d′ − (w + b)| =⇒ (d′ − w − b)2 − (2w + b− a)2 > 0 (A.15)
a− (t′ + b) < v − |d′ − (t′ + b)| =⇒ (d′ − t′ − b)2 − (2t′ + b− a)2 < 0 (A.16)
Subtracting (A.16) from (A.14), and simplifying the resulting expression gives us,
(t′ − v) [3(t′ + v) + 2(d′ + b− 2a)] > 0. Since t′ > v, it must be that,
(t′ + v) > −2
3
(d′ + b− 2a) (A.17)
Similarly, subtracting (A.16) from (A.15), and simplifying the resulting expression
gives us, (t′ − w) [3(t′ + w) + 2(d′ + b− 2a)] > 0. Since t′ < w, it must be that,
(t′ + w) < −2
3
(d′ + b− 2a) (A.18)
Together, expressions (A.17) and (A.18) imply,
(t′ + w) < −2
3
(d′ + b− 2a) < (t′ + v) =⇒ (t′ + w) < (t′ + v)
This is a contradition since v < w. This established that it cannot be that types v
and w prefer the status quo, (xv = 0, dv = 0), and a type t′ ∈ (v, w) prefers
implementation, (x = 1, d = d′). A similar analysis shows that it cannot be that
types v and w prefer implementation, (xv = 1, d = dv), and type t′ prefers the
status quo, (x = 0, d′ = 0).
Case B: Assume xv = x′ and dv 	= d′.
We need only consider the case of xv = x′ = 1, since x = 0 implies d = 0. Assume
mv induces implementation, (xv = 1, d = dv), and m′ also induce implemetation,
(x′ = 1, d = d′), such that dv 	= d′. Expressions (A.11), (A.12), and (A.13)
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respectively imply that,
v − |dv − (v + b)| > v − |d′ − (v + b)| ⇒ (d′ − v − b)2 > (dv − v − b)2 (A.19)
w − |dv − (w + b)| > w − |d′ − (w + b)| ⇒ (d′ − w − b)2 > (dv − w − b)2 (A.20)
t′ − |dv − (t′ + b)| < t′ − |d′ − (t′ + b)| ⇒ (d′ − t′ − b)2 < (dv − t′ − b)2 (A.21)
Subtracting (A.21) from (A.19), and simplifying the resulting expression gives us,
2(dv − d′)(v − t′) > 0
Since v < t′, it must be that, dv < d′.
Similarly, subtracting (A.21) from (A.20), and simplifying the resulting expression
gives us,
2(dv − d′)(w − t′) > 0
Since w > t′, it must be that, dv > d′. This is a contradiction again. Thus, it
cannot be that types v and w prefer x = 1 with d = dv, and a type t′ ∈ (v, w)
prefers x = 1 with d = d′ such that dv 	= d′.
Step 3: We derive the borders of the intervals presented in Lemma 1. Most of
these are derived in the main text. For convenience, we present these here again: If
(r1 + bS) <
1
2
(r1 + r2), then
r1 =
2aS + r2 − 4bS
5
(A.22)
If (r1 + bS) >
1
2
(r1 + r2), then
r1 =
2aS − r2
3
(A.23)
Borders ri for all i > 2 are determined by,
(ri+1 − ri) = (ri − ri−1) + 4bS (A.24)
To derive the expression ri for all i > 2, we can rewrite expression (A.24) as
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ri+1 = 2ri − ri−1 + 4bS which implies,
r3 = 2r2 − r1 + 4bS
r4 = 2r3 − r2 + 4bS = 3r2 − 2r1 + (3)4bS
r5 = 2r4 − r4 + 4bS = 4r2 − 3r1 + (6)4bS
· · ·
ri = (i− 1)r2 − (i− 2)r1 + 2(i− 2)(i− 1)bS (A.25)
Using this expression for ri in (A.25), along with the expression for r1, (equations
(A.22) and (A.23)), we can derive the solutions for r1 and r2 for each of the two
cases.
Case 1: 1
2
(r1 + r2) > r1 + bS:
r1 =
h+ 2(n− 1)aS − 2n(n− 1)bS
4n− 3 (A.26)
r2 =
5h+ 2(n− 2)aS − 2(5n− 3)(n− 2)bS
4n− 3 (A.27)
Case 2: 1
2
(r1 + r2) < r1 + bS:
r1 =
2(n− 1)aS − h+ 2(n− 1)(n− 2)bS
4n− 5 (A.28)
r2 =
3h+ 2(n− 2)aS − 6(n− 1)(n− 2)bS
4n− 5 (A.29)
To derive the maximum number of words n¯, we express the length of a partition as
the sum of all intervals.
h− l = (r1 − r0) + (r2 − r1) + (r3 − r2) + · · ·+ (rn − rn−1) (A.30)
= (r1 − r0) + (n− 1)(r2 − r1) + 4b
n−2∑
k=1
k (A.31)
= (r1 − r0) + (n− 1)(r2 − r1) + (n− 1)(n− 2)2b (A.32)
We ﬁrst note that as bS increases, the length of the second interval (r2 − r1) goes to
zero before the length of the ﬁrst interval (r1 − r0) goes to zero. Speciﬁcally, the
length of interval (r2 − r1) goes to zero under case 2 where r1 and r2 are given by
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(A.28) and (A.29) respectively. Rewriting (A.32) implies,
(r2 − r1) = 1
n− 1 (h− r1)− (n− 2)2b > 0
Substituting out r1 using (A.28), and solving the resulting expression for n gives us,
n <
1
2
√
2(h− 1
2
aS)
bS
+ 1 +
3
2
The expected payoﬀ to D is given by,
∫ r1
r0
(aD − t) dt+
n−1∑
i=2
(∫ ri+1
ri
(
t−
∣∣∣∣ri + ri+12 − t
∣∣∣∣
)
dt
)
=
∫ r1
r0
(aD − t) dt+
n−1∑
i=2
(∫ ri+ri+1
2
ri
(
2t− ri + ri+1
2
)
dt+
∫ ri+1
ri+ri+1
2
ri + ri+1
2
dt
)
The expected payoﬀ to S is given by,
∫ r1
r0
(aS − t− bS) dt+
n−1∑
i=2
(∫ ri+1
ri
(
t−
∣∣∣∣ri + ri+12 − t− bS
∣∣∣∣
)
dt
)
=
∫ r1
r0
(aS − t− bS) dt+
n−1∑
i=2
(∫ ri+ri+1
2
ri
(
2t− ri + ri+1
2
+ bS
)
dt+
∫ ri+1
ri+ri+1
2
(
ri + ri+1
2
− bS)dt
)
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A.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 3.
We show that the sender follows an interval strategy. In this proof, denote the
realization of q as the sender’s type. In step 1, we will show by contradiction that if
two sender types prefer to induce the same threshold in equilibrium, then all types
in between these two types also prefer to induce the same threshold in equilibrium.
That is, all types that prefer the same threshold in equilibrium form a closed convex
set. In step 2, we will show that if two sender types prefer to induce two diﬀerent
thresholds, then the higher (lower) type must prefer a lower (higher) threshold.
Step 1: Let C of types q1 and q3, with q1 < q3, send a report r1 that induces their
most preferred threshold t∗(r1) = t1. Let there be a type q2 such that q1 < q2 < q3,
and let q2 send a report r2 that induces his most preferred threshold t
∗(r2) = t2
such that t1 	= t2. This implies:
(i) uA(q1, r1) > u
A(q1, r2),
∫ t¯
t1
(b+ vt+ q1)dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
(b+ vt+ q1)dFt > 0 (A.33)
(ii) uA(q3, r1) > u
A(q3, r2),
∫ t¯
t1
(b+ vt+ q3)dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
(b+ vt+ q3)dFt > 0 (A.34)
(iii) uA(q2, r1) < u
A(q2, r2),
∫ t¯
t1
(b+ vt+ q2)dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
(b+ vt+ q2)dFt < 0 (A.35)
Then subtracting equation (A.35) from equation (A.33) implies,
(q1 − q2)
(∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt
)
> 0
Since q1 < q2 it must be that
∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt < 0, which implies t1 > t2.
Similarly, subtracting equation (A.35) from equation (A.34) implies,
(q3 − q2)
(∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt
)
> 0
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Since q2 > q3 it must be that
∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt > 0, which implies t1 < t2.
Thus a contradiction. It must be that in equilibrium if types q1 and q3 prefer to
induce a threshold t1 over t2, then all types q ∈ (q1, q3) also prefer t1 over t2. In
other words, all types (q1, q3) form a convex set.
Step 2: We show by contradiction that if in equilibrium two sender types prefer to
induce diﬀerent thresholds, then the higher (lower) type must prefer a lower
(higher) threshold. Let there be A of types q1 and q2, with q1 < q2. Let there be
two thresholds induced in equilibrium t1 and t2, with t1 < t2. Assume that,
(i) type q1 weakly prefers the lower threshold t1, E[u
A|t1, q1] ≥ E[uA|t2, q1]:
∫ t¯
t1
(b+ vt+ q1)dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
(b+ vt+ q1)dFt ≥ 0 (A.36)
and (ii) type q2 strictly prefers the higher threshold t2, E[u
A|t1, q2] < E[uA|t2, q2]:
∫ t¯
t1
(b+ vt+ q2)dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
(b+ vt+ q2)dFt < 0 (A.37)
Subtracting expression A.37 from expression A.36 implies,
(q1 − q2)
(∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt
)
≥ 0
Since q1 < q2, it must be that
∫ t¯
t1
dFt −
∫ t¯
t2
dFt ≤ 0, which implies t1 ≥ t2. This is a
contradiction, thus, higher types must prefer a lower threshold.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Assume t ∈ [−t¯, t¯] and q ∈ [−q¯, q¯]. The agent with v = 1 is indiﬀerent between
sending a report ri and ri+1 ∀ i = {1, · · · , N − 1} at q = qi if,
E[uA(ti, q = qi)] = E[u
A(ti+1, q = qi)]. Thus,
t¯− ti
2t¯
(
b+
t¯+ ti
2
+ qi
)
=
t¯− ti+1
2t¯
(
b+
t¯+ ti+1
2
+ qi
)
This reduces to,
qi = −b− ti + ti+1
2
(A.38)
Substituting out ti = − qi−1+qi2 and ti+1 = − qi+qi+12 , the incentive constraint can be
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rewritten as,
(qi+1 − qi) = (qi − qi−1) + 4b (A.39)
The maximum number of intervals that satisfy this constraint for any given b is
determined as follows. Since an increase in b shifts all boundries qi to the left, the
length of the ﬁrst interval along a partition of size N approaches zero as b increases.
For the N -step paritition to exist, the ﬁrst interval must be of a positive length.
Deﬁne the length of an interval along [−q¯, q¯] as li = qi − qi−1 for i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
The incentive constraint can be expressed as, li+1 = li + 4b. Using this, along with
the boundary conditions q0 = −q¯ and qN = q¯, the sum of all intervals along [−q¯, q¯]
for an N -step partition can be written in terms of l1 = q1 − q0 as,
2q¯ =
N∑
i=1
li = Nl1 +
N(N − 1)
2
4b
which implies that,
l1 =
2q¯
N
− 2(N − 1)b (A.40)
Solving l1 > 0 for N gives the expression for the maximum incentive compatible
intervals for a given b,
N < N¯(b) =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1 +
4q¯
b
Proof of Proposition 8.
Assume t ∈ [−t¯, t¯] and q ∈ [−q¯, q¯]. It needs to be shown that, i) b has a stronger
eﬀect on a boundary along a partition of [−q¯, q¯] if v = 1 than if v = 0, and ii) that
an informative equilibrium breaks down quicker under v = 1. The ﬁrst is
straightfoward to show. If v = 0, boundary q1 = −b always shifts one-to-one. The
boundaries if v = 1 can be derived as follows. Expression (A.40) implies,
q1 =
(2−N)q¯
N
− 2(N − 1)b (A.41)
Using equations (A.39), (A.41), and the boundary conditions q0 = −q¯, and qN = q¯,
the following expression for qi can be derived for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
qi =
2i−N
N
q¯ − 2i(N − i)b (A.42)
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The partial derivative with respect to b is −2i(N − i). It is straightforward that
the absolute value is larger than 1 for all N and i.
The second is also straight foward to derive now. A length of an interval li can be
derived for internal communication using expression (A.42),
li = qi − qi−1 = 2q¯
N
− 2(N + 1− 2i)b (A.43)
An informative equilibrium with v = 1 breaks down if l1 approaches zero for
N = 2. Thus, if b > 1
2
q¯. Communication with v = 0 breaks down if q1 approaches
q0 = −q¯. Thus if b > q¯.

References
References
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997), “Formal and real authority in
organizations.” Journal of political economy, 1–29.
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), “Production, information costs,
and economic organization.” The American Economic Review, 62, pp. 777–795.
Anderson, Erin (2008), “The salesperson as outside agent or employee: A
transaction cost analysis.” Marketing Science, 27, 70–84.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1975), “Vertical integration and communication.” The Bell
Journal of Economics, 6, pp. 173–183.
Aumann, Robert J (1976), “Agreeing to disagree.” The annals of statistics,
1236–1239.
Austen-Smith, David (1993), “Information and inﬂuence: Lobbying for agendas
and votes.” American Journal of Political Science, 37, pp. 799–833.
Austen-Smith, David (1994), “Strategic transmission of costly information.”
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 955–963.
Austen-Smith, David (1997), “Interest groups: Money, information and inﬂuence.”
In Perspectives on public choice: a handbook (Dennis C Mueller, ed.), Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Austen-Smith, David and John R Wright (1992), “Competitive lobbying for a
legislator’s vote.” Social Choice and Welfare, 9, 229–257.
78 References
Banks, Jeﬀrey S. (1990), “Monopoly agenda control and asymmetric information.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 445–464.
Becker, Gary S (1983), “A theory of competition among pressure groups for
political inﬂuence.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 371–400.
Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond (2001), “Theories of
delegation.” Annual review of political science, 4, 235–269.
Bennedsen, Morten and Sven E Feldmann (2006), “Informational lobbying and
political contributions.” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 631–656.
Bertrand, Marianne and Antoinette Schoar (2003), “Managing with style: The
eﬀect of managers on ﬁrm policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118,
1169–1208.
Bresnahan, Timothy and Jonathan Levin (2012), Vertical Integration and Market
Structure, in The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton University
Press.
Chakraborty, Archishman and Bilge Yilmaz (2013), “Authority, consensus and
governance.” Working Paper.
Che, Yeon-Koo, Wouter Dessein, and Navin Kartik (2013), “Pandering to
persuade.” American Economic Review, 103, pp. 47–79.
Chiba, Saori and Kaiwen Leong (2014), “Cheap talk with outside options.”
Working Paper.
Coase, R. H. (1937), “The nature of the ﬁrm.” Economica, 4, pp. 386–405.
Cotton, Christopher (2012), “Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and
contribution limits when money buys access.” Journal of Public Economics, 96,
369–386.
Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel (1982), “Strategic information transmission.”
Econometrica, 50, pp. 1431–1451.
Cre´mer, Jacques (1993), “Corporate culture and shared knowledge.” Industrial and
Corporate Change, 2, 351–386.
Dahm, Matthias and Nicola´s Porteiro (2008), “Informational lobbying under the
shadow of political pressure.” Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 531–559.
References 79
De Barreda, Ines Moreno (2010), “Cheap talk with two-sided private information.”
Job Market Paper, Working.
Denter, Philipp, John Morgan, and Dana Sisak (2011), “”where ignorance is
bliss,’tis folly to be wise“: Transparency in contests.” Technical report, Working
Paper.
Dessein, Wouter (2002), “Authority and communication in organizations.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 69, 811–838.
Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole (1999), “Advocates.” Journal of political
economy, 107, 1–39.
Drucker, Peter (1981), “Why management consultants?” URL
http://anoovaconsulting.biz/drucker.pdf.
Dur, Robert and Otto H Swank (2005), “Producing and manipulating
information.” The Economic Journal, 115, 185–199.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel (1987), “Collective decisionmaking and
standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment
procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 3, pp. 287–335.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel (1989), “Asymmetric information and
legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee.” American Journal of Political
Science, 33, pp. 459–490.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel (1990), “Organization of informative
committees by a rational legislature.” American Journal of Political Science, 34,
pp. 531–564.
Grossman, Gene M and Elhanan Helpman (2001), Special interest politics. MIT
press.
Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (2008), “A theory of board control and size.”
Review of Financial Studies, 21, 1797–1832.
Holmstro¨m, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), “Multitask principal-agent analyses:
Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design.” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 7, pp. 24–52.
80 References
Holmstro¨m, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994), “The ﬁrm as an incentive system.”
The American Economic Review, 84, pp. 972–991.
Holmstro¨m, Bengt and John Roberts (1998), “The boundaries of the ﬁrm
revisited.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 73–94.
Ishida, Junichiro and Takashi Shimizu (2009), “Cheap talk with an informed
receiver.” Technical report, ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and
Economic Research, Osaka University.
Kim, Chulyoung (2012), “The value of information in legal systems.” Technical
report, Working Paper.
Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2001), “A model of expertise.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 747–775.
Lai, Ernest K (2014), “Expert advice for amateurs.” Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 103, pp. 1–16.
Lazear, Edward P (1995), “Corporate culture and the diﬀusion of values.” Trends
in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase
Competitiveness, 89–133.
Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoﬀrey Tate (2005), “Ceo overconﬁdence and corporate
investment.” The Journal of Finance, 60, 2661–2700.
Malmendier, Ulrike and Geoﬀrey Tate (2008), “Who makes acquisitions? ceo
overconﬁdence and the market’s reaction.” Journal of Financial Economics, 89,
20–43.
Malmgren, H. B. (1961), “Information, expectations and the theory of the ﬁrm.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, pp. 399–421.
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1986), “Relying on the information of interested
parties.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 18–32.
Mitchell, William C and Michael C Munger (1991), “Economic models of interest
groups: An introductory survey.” American journal of political science, 512–546.
Mueller Dennis, C (2003), Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
References 81
Niskanen, William A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government.
Chicago & New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc.
Niskanen, William A. (1975), “Bureaucrats and politicians.” Journal of Law and
Economics, 18, pp. 617–643.
Olson, Mancur (1965), Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, revised edition. Harvard University Press.
Olszewski, Wojciech (2004), “Informal communication.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 117, 180–200.
Potters, Jan and Frans Van Winden (1992), “Lobbying and asymmetric
information.” Public choice, 74, 269–292.
Rantakari, Heikki (2014), “Project selection with strategic communication and
further investigations.” Available at SSRN 1962796.
Shin, Hyun Song (1994), “The burden of proof in a game of persuasion.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 64, 253–264.
Sobel, Joel (1985), “Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should
bear the burden of proof?” In Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Alvin E
Roth, ed.), chapter 12, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Swank, Otto H (2011), “Why do defendants ever plead guilty?” Technical report,
Working Paper.
Tullock, Gordon (1980), “Eﬃcient rent-seeking.” In Toward a theory of the
rent-seeking society (James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison, and Gordon
Tullock, eds.), 4, Texas AM University Press.
Van den Steen, Eric (2005), “Organizational beliefs and managerial vision.”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21, 256–283.
Van den Steen, Eric (2010a), “Culture clash: The costs and beneﬁts of
homogeneity.” Management Science, 56, 1718–1738.
Van den Steen, Eric (2010b), “On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate
culture).” The RAND Journal of Economics, 41, 617–648.
Visser, Bauke and Otto H Swank (2007), “On committees of experts.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 337–372.
82 References
Watson, Joel (1996), “Information transmission when the informed party is
confused.” Games and Economic Behavior, 12, 143–161.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications. New York: The Free Press.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York:
The Free Press.
The Tinbergen Institute is the Institute for Economic Research, which was founded
in 1987 by the Faculties of Economics and Econometrics of the Erasmus University
Rotterdam, University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. The
Institute is named after the late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize
laureate in economics in 1969. The Tinbergen Institute is located in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam. The following books recently appeared in the Tinbergen Institute
Research Series:
605. N. MARTYNOVA, Incentives and Regulation in Banking
606. D. KARSTANJE, Unraveling Dimensions: Commodity Futures Curves and
Equity Liquidity
607. T.C.A.P. GOSENS, The Value of Recreational Areas in Urban Regions
608. .M. MAR, The Impact of Aid on Total Government Expenditures
609. C. LI, Hitchhiking on the Road of Decision Making under Uncertainty
610. L. ROSENDAHL HUBER, Entrepreneurship, Teams and Sustainability: a
Series of Field Experiments
611. X. YANG, Essays on High Frequency Financial Econometrics
612. A.H. VAN DER WEIJDE, The Industrial Organization of Transport Markets:
Modeling pricing, Investment and Regulation in Rail and Road Networks
613. H.E. SILVA MONTALVA, Airport Pricing Policies: Airline Conduct, Price
Discrimination, Dynamic Congestion and Network Eﬀects
614. C. DIETZ, Hierarchies, Communication and Restricted Cooperation in
Cooperative Games
615. M.A. ZOICAN, Financial System Architecture and Intermediation Quality
616. G. ZHU, Three Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance
617. M. PLEUS, Implementations of Tests on the Exogeneity of Selected Variables
and their Performance in Practice
618. B. VAN LEEUWEN, Cooperation, Networks and Emotions: Three Essays in
Behavioral Economics
619. A.G. KOPNYI-PEUKER, Endogeneity Matters: Essays on Cooperation and
Coordination
620. X. WANG, Time Varying Risk Premium and Limited Participation in
Financial Markets
621. L.A. GORNICKA, Regulating Financial Markets: Costs and Trade-oﬀs
622. A. KAMM, Political Actors playing games: Theory and Experiments
623. S. VAN DEN HAUWE, Topics in Applied Macroeconometrics
624. F.U. BRUNING, Interbank Lending Relationships, Financial Crises and
Monetary Policy
625. J.J. DE VRIES, Estimation of Alonsos Theory of Movements for Commuting
626. M. POPAWSKA, Essays on Insurance and Health Economics
627. X. CAI, Essays in Labor and Product Market Search
628. L. ZHAO, Making Real Options Credible: Incomplete Markets, Dynamics,
and Model Ambiguity
629. K. BEL, Multivariate Extensions to Discrete Choice Modeling
630. Y. ZENG, Topics in Trans-boundary River sharing Problems and Economic
Theory
631. M.G. WEBER, Behavioral Economics and the Public Sector
632. E. CZIBOR, Heterogeneity in Response to Incentives: Evidence from Field
Data
633. A. JUODIS, Essays in Panel Data Modelling
634. F. ZHOU, Essays on Mismeasurement and Misallocation on Transition
Economies
635. P. MULLER, Labor Market Policies and Job Search
636. N. KETEL, Empirical Studies in Labor and Education Economics
637. T.E. YENILMEZ, Three Essays in International Trade and Development
638. L.P. DE BRUIJN, Essays on Forecasting and Latent Values
639. S. VRIEND, Proﬁling, Auditing and Public Policy: Applications in Labor and
Health Economics
640. M.L. ERGUN, Fat Tails in Financial Markets
641. T. HOMAR, Intervention in Systemic Banking Crises
642. R. LIT, Time Varying Parameter Models for Discrete Valued Time Series
643. R.H. KLEIJN, Essays on Bayesian Model Averaging using Economic Time
Series
644. S. MUNS, Essays on Systemic Risk
645. B.M. SADABA, Essays on the Empirics of International Financial Markets
646. H. KOC, Essays on Preventive Care and Health Behaviors
647. V.V.M. MISHEVA, The Long Run Eﬀects of a Bad Start
648. W. LI, Essays on Empirical Monetary Policy
649. J.P. HUANG, Topics on Social and Economic Networks
650. K.A. RYSZKA, Resource Extraction and the Green Paradox: Accounting for
Political Economy Issues and Climate Policies in a Heterogeneous World
651. J.R. ZWEERINK, Retirement Decisions, Job Loss and Mortality
652. M. K. KAGAN, Issues in Climate Change Economics: Uncertainty,
Renewable Energy Innovation and Fossil Fuel Scarcity
653. T.V. WANG, The Rich Domain of Decision Making Explored: The
Non-Triviality of the Choosing Process
654. D.A.R. BONAM, The Curse of Sovereign Debt and Implications for Fiscal
Policy
